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Zusammenfassung
In der vorliegenden Dissertation fu¨hren wir das spieltheoretische Modell von Bud-
getspielen ein und analysieren dessen Eigenschaften in Bezug auf reine Nash Gle-
ichgewichte. In einem Budget Game konkurieren die Spieler um Ressourcen, welche
ein begrenztes Budget haben. Als Strategie wa¨hlt ein Spieler einen von endlichen
vielen Bedarfsvektoren. Jeder Bedarfsvektor entha¨lt einen nicht-negativen Bedarf
fu¨r jede Ressource. Wenn der Gesamtbedarf aller Spieler an eine einzige Ressource
nicht deren Budget u¨berschreitet, so entspricht der Gewinn jedes Spielers durch
diese Ressource seinem Bedarf. Andernfalls wird das Budget zwischen allen Spiel-
ern proportional zu ihren Bedarf aufgeteilt. Fu¨r jede Kombination von Spieler und
Ressourcen ist der Bedarf direkt an die Strategie des Spielers gebunden und kann
sich daher wa¨hrend der Best-Response Dynamik vera¨ndern. Wir zeigen, dass reine
Nash Gleichgewicht im Allgemeinen nicht in Budgetspielen existieren und betra-
chten daher verschiedene alternative Konzepte.
Geordnete Budgetspiele stellen eine Variante von Budgetspielen da, welche die
Reihenfolge hervor heben, in der die Spieler sich fu¨r ihre Strategie entscheiden.
Diese Spiele sind exakte Potentialspiele, fu¨r welche sogar die Existenz von super-
starken reinen Nash Gleichgewichte garantiert werden kann und fu¨r die starke reine
Nash Gleichgewichte effizient berechnet werden ko¨nnen.
In einem α-approximativem reine Nash Gleichgewicht existieren keine einseiti-
gen Strategiewechsel, welche den Gewinn des jeweiligen Spielers um mehr als einen
konstanten Faktor α > 1 erho¨hen. Fu¨r viele Anwendungen stellen diese eine realis-
tischere Alternative zu reinen Nash Gleichgewicht dar. Wir geben obere und untere
Schranken fu¨r α an, so dass α-approximative reine Nash Gleichgewichte fu¨r Budget-
spiele garantiert werden ko¨nnen. Daru¨ber hinaus betrachten wir eine approximative
Version der Best-Response Dynamik, welche unter bestimmten Bedingungen schnell
konvergiert und welche dazu verwendet werden kann, die optimale Lo¨sung, also das
Strategieprofil mit maximalen sozialem Wohlstand, zu approximieren.
Durch die Einschra¨nkung der Struktur der Strategiera¨ume stellen wir reine Nash
Gleichgewichte fu¨r bestimmte Klassen von Budgetspielen wieder her. Wir konzen-
trieren uns auf Singleton und Matroid Budgetspiele. In einem Singleton Budgetspiel
verwendet ein Spieler zu jedem Zeitpunkt nur eine Ressource. In einem Matroid
Budgetspiel kann jeder Strategiewechsel in eine Folge von kleineren zerlegt werden,
welche alle gu¨ltig sind und jeweils den Gewinn des Spielers durch Austauschen einer
einzelnen Ressource erho¨hen.
v
Wir zeigen auch, dass die Berechnung der optimalen Lo¨sung sowohl von Bud-
getspielen als auch geordneten Budgetspielen a¨quivalent und in beiden Fa¨llen NP-
schwer ist.
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Abstract
In this thesis, we introduce the game theoretical model of budget games and analyze
their properties regarding pure Nash equilibria. In a budget game, players compete
over resources, which have a limited budget. As his strategy, each player decides
between a finite number of demand vectors. Each demand vector contains one non-
negative demand for every resource. Provided the total demand by all players on
a single resource does not exceed its budget, the utility each player receives from
that resource equals his demand. Otherwise, the budget is split between all players
proportionally to their demands. For any combination of player and resource, the
corresponding demand is directly tied to the players strategy and can therefore
change during the best-response dynamic. After showing that pure Nash equilibria
generally do not exist in budget games, we consider several alternative concepts.
Ordered budget games are a variation of budget games, which emphasize the
order in which the players choose their strategies. These games are exact potential
games for which even the existence of super-strong pure Nash equilibria can be
guaranteed and strong pure Nash equilibria can be computed efficiently.
In an α-approximate pure Nash equilibrium, no unilateral strategy change in-
creases the utility of the corresponding player by more than some constant factor
α > 1. For many applications, these are a more realistic compared to the concept of
pure Nash equilibria. We give upper and lower bound on α such that α-approximate
pure Nash equilibria are guaranteed in budget games. In addition, we look at an
approximate version of the best-response dynamic, which converges quickly under
certain conditions and can also be used to approximate the optimal solution, i.e.
the strategy profile which maximizes social welfare.
By restricting the structure of the strategy spaces, we restore pure Nash equilibria
to certain classes of budget games. We focus on singleton and matroid budget
games. In a singleton budget game, a player uses only one resource at a time. In
a matroid budget game, every strategy change can be decomposed into a sequence
of smaller ones which are still valid an with each already increasing the utility of
the player by swapping only one resource for another.
We also argue that computing the optimal solution is equivalent for both budget
games and ordered budget games and NP-hard in both cases.
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Introduction
In the real world, the total payoff obtainable from a system is often independent
of the number of its participants. For example, the computational capacity of a
server is usually fixed and does not grow with the number of requests. Assume a
server is being used by various clients. By increasing their number, the workload
on the server grows. If this workload exceeds the capacity of the server, then it is
no longer possible to fully satisfy every client. Instead, each client receives a share
of the servers capacity, which naturally is at most the amount actually needed to
satisfy his requests. We can regard this share as a form of utility which the client
receives from the server.
A similar situation can be observed in markets for specific goods or services.
A market can provide only a limited amount of sales to its providers before the
consumers are satisfied. Even if more providers enter the market, the spending
power of the consumers remains the same and if their number grows too large, then
some of them can no longer receive the desired revenue. In this context, it becomes
even more natural to regard the market share of a provider as his utility.
We study such scenarios in a game theoretic setting. “Game theory aims to
model situations in which multiple participants interact or affect each other’s out-
comes” [26]. The participants are usually called players. Regarding the previous
examples, these are the clients and providers while the servers and markets can be
considered as resources with a limited budget (computational capacity, spending
power). We take another look at our initial example. If there are multiple servers
and a client can choose the server(s) to handle his requests, then this choice is
called his strategy. The important aspect in game theory is that a player can only
control his own strategy, but the outcome he experiences depends on the strategies
of all players. In our context, a client may wish to use a certain server combination,
but if these servers are also working on too many other requests, then he does not
receive the full computational power needed and his utility decreases. In general,
1
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request request
serverserverserverserverserverserver
Figure 1.1: Two examples of a request being allocated to a set of three servers.
The request is composed of six services. Assuming the computational
power needed for each service is the same (e.g. 1), the two allocations
impose different demands on the servers: (4, 2, 0) and (0, 3, 3). Due to
constraints resulting from the type of the services or the servers, other
allocations may not be possible.
we assume a strategy to be a vector of non-negative demands on the resources.
Note that not every allocation of the servers may be feasible for a given client. If a
request is composed of atomic services, then a client can split these services among
several servers, but each individual service has to be located as a whole on a sin-
gle server. An allocation corresponds to a non-negative demand for computational
power on each server and these demands can change with a different strategy. See
Figure 1.1 for an example.
The impact of the client on a server depends on his current strategy and can
change with it. This property of strategy-dependent demands also holds for our
second example concerning markets. Assume there is more than one market and
each provider has to make the decision of how much of his goods or services to
offer in each of them. While it is technically possible to choose the supply of any
individual market freely, this may not be economic due to investment costs. In such
cases, a provider may only decide between a small number of different allocations.
We introduce a new game theoretic model called budget games, which captures
the two main properties discussed so far: budget-restricted resources and strategy-
dependent demands. In a budget game, each player tries to maximize his own
utility through the choice of his strategy. This utility is defined as the sum of the
individual utilities he receives from the different resources and the utility obtained
from a resource may never be larger than his current demand on it. If the total
demand of all players on a resource does not exceed its budget, then the utilities of
the players are exactly their demands. Otherwise, some or all players receive less.
We are interested in the effects of rational decision making by the individual
players. For any given situation, the strategy of one or more players may not be
optimal, i.e. a player can increase his utility on his own through a unilateral strategy
2
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change. This creates a best-response dynamic in which one strategy change can
lead to another. However, there may also be situations in which every player has
already optimized his utility, given the strategies of the other players are fixed.
Such states are called pure Nash equilibria and their existence and properties in
budget games are the central topic of this thesis. Pure Nash equilibria are states
in which no player wants to unilaterally deviate from his current strategy, as this
would yield no benefit (i.e. an increase in his utility) under the given situation.
They can be used to predict the outcome of a game with rational players, since
each player will consider the strategy choices of the others before deciding on his
own strategy. However, one of our first results will show that in general, there are
no pure Nash equilibria in budget games to begin with. Therefore, we consider at
three alternative concepts.
1. Ordered Budget Games
The first is a variation of budget games called ordered budget games, which are no
longer strategic. In a strategic game, the outcome of multiple strategy changes by
different players only depends on the resulting state. Ordered budget games, on
the other hand, emphasize the order of the player decisions and the final outcome
strongly depends on it. While strategic games are often analyzed as one-shot games,
they often do not capture situations like a new provider entering a market having
a disadvantage against those already established due to the consumers prioritizing
products they already know. In ordered budget games, this is different. When a
player changes his strategy, the utility he receives from a resource is at most its
remaining budget. As a result, other players using that resource are not affected.
To keep the idea of a strategy change attractive, we introduce the concept of tasks,
which allow a player to keep his utility from resources being used in both the old
and new strategy. We are going to see that these games always have a pure Nash
equilibrium.
The way the budget of a resource is shared between the players in our original
model (in contrast to ordered budget games) can be called proportional utility shar-
ing. Simply put, the larger the demand of a single player on a resource, the larger
his share of that resource’s budget. If the total demand on a resource exceeds its
budget, we compute the shares of the individual players using this simple formula:
budget · demand of the player
total demand on the resource
.
This approach is not always optimal. There are results for models similar to ours
which show that proportional cost sharing does not guarantee the existence of a
pure Nash equilibrium (cf. Chapter 3.2). For other cost sharing mechanisms, e.g.
based on the Shapley value, this is different. However, we do not approach this
from a mechanism design angle. Instead, we consider this system and especially
the structure of the utility functions as given and are interested in its strength
3
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and weaknesses, mainly regarding pure Nash equilibria. Since they do not exist in
general, we weaken this concept, which brings us to the second alternative concept.
2. Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Budget Games
In an α-approximate pure Nash equilibrium, no unilateral strategy change yields
an increase by more than some constant factor α > 1 in the corresponding player’s
utility. In many applications, this concept is more realistic than the classic notion
of (exact) pure Nash equilibria, which can also be considered as α-approximate
pure Nash equilibrium for α = 1. Usually, players are not interested in marginal
increases in their utilities, especially if this could destabilize the current state of
the game. In such cases, the guarantee of a certain utility weighs larger than the
possibility of some small improvement.
While not every budget game has a pure Nash equilibrium, there is also a large
number of instances for which they do exist. To conclude this thesis, we ask which
kind of restrictions on budget games are necessary in order to obtain exact equilib-
ria.
3. Pure Nash Equilibria in Singleton and Matroid Budget Games
When restricting the class of budget games, our focus lies on the structure of the
strategies and we consider both singleton and matroid budget games. In a singleton
budget game, a player uses only a single resource at a time. In other words, every
strategy vector contains a demand of 0 for all resources except one. However, this
does not necessarily imply that the demand of a player is fixed. Instead, it may
vary from resource to resource, modeling differences between the resources aside
from their budgets. In matroid budget games, all strategies of a given player use
the same number of resources and every strategy change can be decomposed into a
sequence of very simple strategy changes, with each switching only one resource for
another. The player could then omit every single of these simple changes and the
resulting strategy change would still be a valid option for him, implying that each
simple strategy change alone already increases his utility. Matroid budget games
are an extended form of singleton budget games.
Besides the existence of (approximate) pure Nash equilibria, we are also interested
in their properties. Although no player can increase his utility by his own, this
does not mean that an equilibrium is also economical and utilizes the resources and
obtains as much of the resources’ budgets as possible. We measure the efficiency of
an equilibrium by comparing its social welfare, i.e. the total utility of all players,
with the largest social welfare of all strategy profiles and are mainly interested in
the worst-case ratio, called the price of anarchy.
The best-response dynamic already mentioned is a natural way for the game to
progress. We consider if it always leads to an equilibrium and how many strategy
changes this takes.
4
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Strategy Space Structure
Restriction Singleton Matroid General
fixed demands FIP FIP no NE
2 resources WA WA ?
ordered players &
NE ? no NE
increasing demand ratios
2 demands, 1 budget WA ? no NE
Table 1.1: Overview of our results regarding pure Nash equilibria in strategic bud-
get games. FIP stands for finite improvement property, WA for weakly
acyclic and NE for pure Nash equilibrium.
We stated that Nash equilibria can be used to predict the outcome of a game. Of
course, this only applies if the players are actually able to compute them. Therefore,
we also consider the complexity of (approximate) pure Nash equilibria and give
efficient algorithms for some of them.
1.1 Result Overview
We introduce the model of budget games and its non-strategic variant called ordered
budget games. Our first result shows that pure Nash equilibria generally do not
exist in budget games. Ordered budget games, on the other hand, are potential
games for which even the existence of super-strong pure Nash equilibria can always
be guaranteed. While strong pure Nash equilibria can be found efficiently, the
computation of super-strong pure Nash equilibria is NP-hard.
Regarding α-approximate Nash equilibria in general budget games, we introduce
an approximate potential function and use it to give both upper and lower bounds
on α. Below the lower bounds, finding any approximate pure Nash equilibrium is
NP-hard. While these bounds depend on the relative size of the players’ demands
(compared to the resources’ budgets), with smaller demands yielding better bounds,
we also give upper bounds for matroid budget games using a different approach.
This time, the results get better with decreasing ratios between the demands of
each individual player.
For pure Nash equilibria in singleton and matroid budget games, we consider
a number of different cases. Our results are summarized in Table 1.1. If the
demands of the players are fixed, i.e. do not depend on their strategy, both singleton
and matroid games have the finite improvement property. This means that the
players will eventually form a pure Nash equilibrium by following the best-response
dynamic. If the game consists of only two resources, then it is at least weakly
5
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acyclic, implying that the best-response dynamic can always reach an equilibrium
if the strategy changes of the players are performed in the right order. Singleton
budget games with more than two resources still have pure Nash equilibria if (a)
the order over the demands of the players is the same for each resource and the
ratios between the different demands are smaller for players with larger demands
or (b) all budgets are the same and every demand in the game is one of two values.
In the second case, the games are even weakly acyclic.
We also consider the efficiency of (approximate) pure Nash equilibria in budget
games. For ordered budget games, the price of stability is 1 while the price of
anarchy is 2. In strategic budget games, the price of anarchy of an α-approximate
pure Nash equilibrium is at most α + 1. In particular, the price of anarchy of a
pure Nash equilibrium is 2. All these bounds are tight.
The time it takes the best-response dynamic in ordered budget games to reach
a pure Nash equilibrium can be exponential in the games description length. For
budget games, we consider an approximate version of this dynamic, which only
consists of strategy changes increasing the utility of the corresponding player by
more than some constant approximation factor α > 1. If α is chosen large enough
and the highest demands of the player do not differ too much from each other, this
approximate best-response dynamic converges quickly towards approximate pure
Nash equilibria.
Computing the strategy profile which maximizes the social welfare is NP-hard
for both strategic and ordered budget games. It can be approximated up to the
constant factor of 1 − 1e for matroid games in linear time and up to a factor of
O
(
1−ε
α2·log(n)
)
in time O (n · α · log 1ε) for the general case, with n denoting the
number of players.
1.2 Structure of this Thesis
The main focus of this thesis lies on the introduction of budget games and the ques-
tion under which properties they possess pure Nash equilibria. A formal definition
of the model of budget games and other important concepts is given in Chapter 2.
Chapter 3 gives an overview of existing literature linked to this thesis. This mainly
concerns congestion games, the research field which is has the strongest connection
to budget games. In Chapter 4, the foundation for our further research is laid,
as we prove that budget games generally do not have pure Nash equilibria. In
addition, we show that the problems of computing the strategy profile with the
highest social welfare for budget games and ordered budget games are equivalent
and NP-hard. The variation of ordered budget games is being analyzed in detail
in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 contains our results regarding approximate pure Nash
equilibria in budget games. In Chapter 7, we consider the existence of pure Nash
equilibria in different forms of singleton and matroid budget games. A last result
deals with approximate pure Nash equilibria in such games. The thesis is concluded
with Chapter 8, where we reflect our results and discuss some open problems.
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2
Model
This chapter gives a formal introduction into the model of budget games as well
as into the other concepts used throughout this thesis. We start with the general
notions of game theory. With these fundamentals, we are able to define both budget
games and ordered budget games before we conclude with some minor concepts from
mathematics.
2.1 General Concepts of Game Theory
We begin this section with a number of general definitions from game theory.
Definition 2.1 (Finite Game). A finite game G is a tuple (N , (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N )
which consists of the following components:
• a set of players N = {1, . . . , n}
• a finite set Si for each player i,
called strategy space of i with si ∈ Si being a strategy of i
• a target function ui : S1 × . . .× Sn → R for each player i
The state of a finite game is described by a combination of strategies, one for
each player.
Definition 2.2 (Strategy Profile). For a finite game G, we call s ∈ S1 × . . .×Sn a
strategy profile of G.
The term finite comes from the fact that these games only have a finite number
of strategy profiles (or states). While there are also games which are not finite
(e.g. with Si = R for some or all i), we only consider finite games in this thesis.
We assume our players to be both selfish and rational. Here, selfish describes the
7
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property that a player is only interested in the value of his own target function,
which he tries to optimize. His only form of influencing this outcome is the choice
of one of his strategies from his own strategy space. However, he cannot directly
control the choices made by the other players. Since his target function not only
depends on his strategy, but on the strategy profile as a whole, the ability of a
single player to determine his individual outcome is limited. Given the strategies of
the other players, he can only pick the strategy which optimizes his target function
under the present conditions. The players act rational, as the value of their target
functions is the only decisive factor when choosing a strategy.
The target functions are usually considered to be either cost functions or utility
functions. Players try to minimize the first and maximize the latter. In the context
of budget games, we consider only utility functions. So if ui(s
′) < ui(s), then player
i prefers the strategy profile s over s′. From now on, we always assume the target
functions to be utility functions.
By default, we expect a strategy profile to be complete, i.e. to list a strategy for
every player in the game. In some situations, however, it can be helpful to consider
only a partial strategy profile. This comes in handy when we want to express the
deviation of one or more players from a given strategy profile. For a strategy profile
s, we write s−i to denote the same strategy profile excluding the strategy of player i.
Furthermore, if s′i is a strategy of player i, we write (s−i, s
′
i) to denote the strategy
profile in which player i chooses s′i and all other players have the same strategy as
in s. The same notation applies for any coalition C ⊆ N and we use (s−C , s′C) to
combine the two strategy profiles s−C and s′C .
An important kind of strategy profiles are pure Nash equilibria, which also rep-
resent the central research focus of our work.
Definition 2.3 (Pure Nash Equilibrium). Let s be a strategy profile of a finite
game G. If for every player i ∈ N and every strategy s′i ∈ Si it holds that
ui(s−i, s′i) ≤ ui(s),
then we call s a pure Nash equilibrium.
In a pure Nash equilibrium, no player has an incentive to change his strategy,
as this would not increase his utility. Pure Nash equilibria can be considered as
stable states of a finite game. Not every finite game has a pure Nash equilibrium,
but assuming they exist and that they can be computed efficiently, they can be
used to predict the behavior of the players. Being in a pure Nash equilibrium does
not necessarily mean that there is no more room for improvement. There may still
be a coalition C of two or more players who would ultimately benefit if they all
change their strategies. To further strengthen the stable aspect of the equilibrium,
we therefore introduce two more versions of pure Nash equilibria.
Definition 2.4 (Strong Pure Nash Equilibrium). Let s be a strategy profile of a
finite game G. If for every coalition C ⊆ N and every strategy profile s′C ∈ ×i∈C Si,
8
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there is at least one player i ∈ C with
ui(s−C , s′C) ≤ ui(s),
then we call s a strong pure Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2.5 (Super-Strong Pure Nash Equilibrium). Let s be a strategy profile
of a finite game G. If for every coalition C ⊆ N and every strategy profile s′C ∈
×i∈C Si, there is at least one player i ∈ C with
ui(s−C , s′C) < ui(s),
then we call s a super-strong pure Nash equilibrium.
For these two kinds of Nash equilibria, we assume that the players are able to
form coalitions and cooperate, i.e. change their strategies in mutual agreement, so
that they all benefit from it in the end. If a strategy profile is not a strong pure
Nash equilibrium, there is a coalition of players such that they can all increase their
utility when working together. Additionally, if it is not a super-strong pure Nash
equilibrium, then it suffices that at least one player can increase his utility while the
others receive the same amount as they do before the collective strategy change.
The central question of this thesis is the existence of pure Nash equilibria in
budget games. One important result of game theory is that every finite game has
a so-called mixed Nash equilibrium [61]. In a mixed Nash equilibrium, instead of
choosing a single strategy deterministically, every player decides on a probability
distribution over his strategy space. In this context, the utilities of the players
become expected values. If for every player, any unilateral change in his probability
distribution does not increase his expected utility, the state is called a mixed Nash
equilibrium. We remark that, as we are going to see later in this chapter, budget
games are also finite games and therefore always possess mixed Nash equilibria.
The prefix pure is used to distinguish pure Nash equilibria from mixed Nash
equilibria. As we only consider pure Nash equilibria to begin with, we mostly omit
the term pure and simply call them Nash equilibria from now on.
If a strategy profile is not a Nash equilibrium, then there is at least one player
who can improve his utility through a unilateral strategy change. This action is
also called an improving move.
Definition 2.6 (Improving Move). Let s = (s1, . . . , si, . . . , sn) be a strategy profile
of a finite game G and s′i ∈ Si such that
ui(s) < ui(s−i, s′i).
Then deviating from si to s
′
i is an improving move for player i.
In many situations, there may be more than one improving move available to a
single player. In this case, we expect the player to choose the one which yields the
highest increase in utility (i.e. the best improving move).
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Definition 2.7 (Best-Response). Let s−i be a strategy profile of a finite game G
excluding player i and s˜i ∈ Si. If
ui(s−i, s′i) ≤ ui(s−i, s˜i)
for all s′i ∈ Si, then s˜i is a best-response of i regarding s−i.
Note that a player always has a best-response to the combined strategies of the
other players, even if there is no improving move. In that case, his current strategy
already is a best-response. The concept of improving moves induces a dynamic on
finite games. Given an initial strategy profile s0, we choose a single player i who
can perform an improving move, which results in the strategy profile s1. We can
then repeat this process over and over, which will either stop when there are no
more improving moves available (i.e. in a Nash equilibrium) or may go on for an
infinite number of steps. As mentioned above, we expect the players to always play
best-response and therefore call this process the best-response dynamic.
If multiple players are able to perform an improving move, we choose one of them
according to some rule (deterministically or at random). After the improving move
of this player, the resulting strategy profile is reevaluated to determine if there are
still improving moves left. This tie-breaker rule directly influences the course of the
best-response dynamic and it is possible for an initial strategy profile s0 to both
lead to a Nash equilibrium as well as create a cycle of strategy profiles, depending
on how this rule operates.
Definition 2.8 (Weakly Acyclic). Let G be a finite game such that for any strategy
profile s0, there exists a sequence (s0, . . . , sNE) such that
• for t ∈ {0, . . . ,NE − 1}, st+1 is obtained from st by a single improving move
of one player
• sNE is a Nash equilibrium
Then G is said to be weakly acyclic.
If a game is weakly acyclic, it is possible (but not guaranteed) to arrive at a Nash
equilibrium after a finite number of improving steps. Even if the best-response
dynamic enters a cycle, it is always possible to escape from it, thus not being
trapped in an inescapable oscillation. Actually computing a Nash equilibrium of
a weakly acyclic game, however, can be more difficult this way, since a simple
execution of the best-response dynamic may not always terminate. This situation
is different when cycles can be ruled out from the start.
Definition 2.9 (Exact Potential Games). Let G be a finite game. If there is a
function φ : S → R such that for every strategy profile s in which some player i can
improve his utility by changing his strategy to s′i ∈ Si, we get
φ(s−i, s′i)− φ(s) = ui(s−i, s′i)− ui(s),
then we call G an exact potential game and φ its exact potential function
10
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An exact potential function assigns a value to every strategy profile in the game.
According to its definition, this value grows with every improving step by the
same amount as the utility of the corresponding player. Therefore there cannot
be any cycles in the best-response dynamic, as the function is strictly increasing.
Similar to weakly acyclic games, we can compute Nash equilibria by using the
best-response dynamic, but this time it is much easier, since the choice of the next
player performing an improving step does not change the fact that we will ultimately
reach a Nash equilibrium. This is called the finite improvement property. An exact
potential function is a strong tool for analyzing games, but in order to prove the
finite improvement property, a weaker concept suffices.
Definition 2.10 (Generalized Ordinal Potential Games). Let G be a finite game.
If there is a function φ : S → R such that for every strategy profile s in which some
player i can improve his utility by changing his strategy to s′i ∈ Si, we get
ui(s−i, s′i)− ui(s) > 0⇒ φ(s−i, s′i)− φ(s) > 0,
then we call G a generalized ordinal potential game and φ its generalized ordinal
potential function.
Just as with exact potential games, a generalized ordinal potential function
strictly increases with every improving step (although it may not be clear by how
much). Still, it directly implies that the underlying game possesses the finite im-
provement property.
Until now, we only considered the utility of individual players. To evaluate a
strategy profile from a global perspective, we look at the total utility of all players
combined.
Definition 2.11 (Social Welfare). Let s be a strategy profile of a finite game G.
We denote with
u(s) :=
∑
i∈N
ui(s)
the social welfare of s.
Since every finite game has only a finite number of strategy profiles, the function
u(s) has a maximum.
Definition 2.12 (Socially Optimal Solution). Let opt be a strategy profile of a
finite game G. If for every s ∈ S it holds that
u(s) ≤ u(opt),
then we call opt the (socially) optimal solution of G.
The social welfare can be regarded as the efficiency of the system which is modeled
by the game. The closer it is to the optimal solution, the better the overall situation.
This collides with the selfish agendas of the players, who are not interested in the
11
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social welfare, but only in their own utilities. As already mentioned, Nash equilibria
are used to predict the outcome of a game. so it is natural to compare the social
welfare of a Nash equilibrium with that of the optimal solution. As there may be
more than one Nash equilibrium, we use two well-established concepts, one for the
worst-case, the other for the best-case situation.
Definition 2.13 (Price of Anarchy). Let opt be the optimal solution and SNE the
set of all Nash equilibria of a finite game G. The price of anarchy of G is defined as
PoA(G) := max
s∈SNE
u(opt)
u(s)
.
Definition 2.14 (Price of Stability). Let opt be the optimal solution and SNE the
set of all Nash equilibria of a finite game G. The price of stability of G is defined as
PoS(G) := min
s∈SNE
u(opt)
u(s)
.
If s is not a Nash equilibrium, then there is at least one player who can further
increase his utility by some margin, no matter how small. When we look at this from
a more practical angle, this concept can seem rather inappropriate. If the benefits
of a strategy change are negligible, a player may stick to his current strategy,
especially if he is aware of the fact that his strategy change can provoke additional
strategy changes by other players, which in turn may only hurt him in the end. As
an alternative to pure Nash equilibria, we therefore also use the already existing
concept of approximate pure Nash equilibria.
Definition 2.15 (Approximate Pure Nash equilibrium). Let α > 1 and s be a
strategy profile of a finite game G. If for every player i ∈ N and every strategy
s′i ∈ Si it holds that
ui(s−i, s′i) ≤ α · ui(s),
then we call s an α-approximate pure Nash equilibrium.
Just like with Nash equilibria, we usually omit the prefix pure and only write
approximate Nash equilibrium. A lot of the definitions so far are based on the
concept of Nash equilibria. In most cases, their adaptation for approximate Nash
equilibria is straightforward. Here, we only emphasize the difference between gen-
eral improving moves (cf. Definition 2.6) and α-improving moves.
Definition 2.16 (α-Improving Move). Let α > 1 and s = (s1, . . . , si, . . . , sn) be a
strategy profile of a finite game G and s′i ∈ Si such that
α · ui(s) < ui(s−i, s′i).
Then deviating from si to s
′
i is an α-improving move for player i.
In contrast to general improving moves, α-improving moves induce a more re-
stricted kind of (best-response) dynamic, in which the players only perform strategy
changes if they yield a sufficient increase in their utility. This dynamic is used sev-
eral times in Chapter 6 when we are dealing with approximate Nash equilibria.
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2.2 Budget Games
In the following two sections, we introduce the central models of this thesis.
Definition 2.17 (Budget Game). A budget game B is a tuple
(N ,R, (br)r∈R, (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ), which consists of the following components:
• a set of players N = {1, . . . , n}
• a set of resources R = {r1, . . . , rm}
• a budget br for each resource r
• a strategy space Si =
{
s1i , . . . , s
ki
i
}
for each player i,
with ski =
(
ski (r1), . . . , s
k
i (rm)
) ∈ Rm≥0
and ski (r) being the demand of strategy sk on resource r
• a utility function ui : S1 × . . .× Sn → R for each player i defined as
ui(s) =
∑
r∈R ui,r(s) with
ui,r(s1, . . . , sn) = min
(
si(r) , si(r) · br∑
j∈N sj(r)
)
In a budget game, the strategy si of a player i is a vector of demands on the
resources. If the demand on resource r is greater than 0, we say that r is used by
si. When talking about a specific strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , si, . . . , sn) in which
r is used by si, we also say that r is (currently) used by i and that si(r) is the
demand of i on r. In some cases, we abstract from the actual demands and only
distinguish between resources being used and not used. In that context, the players
simply choose resources instead of demand vectors.
Different players can have different demands on the same resource and even the
demand of a single player may vary depending on his strategy. However, because
demands are associated with the strategies, they cannot be picked freely by the
players. The only way to change a demand value is to change the whole strategy,
which in turn may alter the remaining demands as well.
Given a strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , si, . . . , sn) of a budget game B, let Tr(s) :=∑
i∈N si(r) be the total demand of a resource r. If Tr(s) ≤ br, then the utility every
player i receives from r equals si(r). For Tr(s) > br, the budget of r is not sufficient
to satisfy the demands of all players. In this case, it is split proportionally, meaning
players with a larger demand receive more than players with a smaller one. The
total utility of a player is the sum of all the utilities he receives from the resources
in B.
In some cases, we want to distinguish between budget games and ordered budget
games, which we are going to introduce in the next section. Since budget games are
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strategic, i.e. the utility of each player only depends on the current strategies, and
ordered budget games are not, we often use the term strategic budget games. Also,
we are sometimes interested in bounding the size of the demands with respect to
the corresponding budgets.
Definition 2.18 (δ-share Budget Game). Let δ > 0. A δ-share budget game B
is a budget game such that for every player i, every s ∈ Si and every resource r,
s(r) ≤ δ · br.
The two definitions of budget games and δ-share budget games are equivalent.
Given a budget game B, we can determine a matching value for δ by simply looking
at the demands in B. Once we have this value, we can label B as a δ-share budget
game. Some of the results in this thesis depend on the value of δ, while others are
independent of it. Depending on which is the case, we either talk about budget
games or δ-share budget games.
We now introduce two special kinds of budget games, defined by the structure of
their strategy spaces.
Definition 2.19 (Singleton Budget Game). A singleton budget game B is a budget
game with the following properties:
• for all i ∈ N , all s, s′ ∈ Si and all r ∈ R, it holds that
s(r) 6= 0 ∧ s′(r) 6= 0⇒ s(r) = s′(r)
• for all i ∈ N and all s ∈ Si, there is exactly one resource r ∈ R with s(r) > 0
In a singleton budget game, each player is using exactly one resource at all times,
so one can imagine the players choosing a place in the topographical sense, where
they are then located. For the second kind of budget games, we first need an
important concept from combinatorics.
Definition 2.20 (Matroid). A matroid is a tupleM = (U , I) whereas U is a finite
set and I ⊆ 2U with the following properties:
• ∅ ∈ I
• T ∈ I and S ⊆ T ⇒ S ∈ I
• S, T ∈ I with |S| < |T | ⇒ ∃u ∈ T \ S such that S ∪ {u} ∈ I
If M = (U , I) is a matroid, then we call the sets S ∈ I independent sets. A
maximal independent set, i.e. a set B ∈ I with |B| ≥ |S| for all S ∈ I, is also called
a basis of the matroid. By this definition, all bases of a matroid have the same
cardinality, which is the rank of M and denoted by rk(M).
One of the most common examples for matroids from graph theory is the follow-
ing. Let G = (V,E) be an undirected graph and I ⊆ 2E contain all sets of edges
without a circle. Then (E, I) is a matroid. If there are no edges, there cannot be
a circle, so ∅ ∈ I. Furthermore, if a set T ∈ I does not contain a circle, then there
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exists no circle in any S ⊆ T , so S ∈ I. Finally, if both S, T ∈ I with |S| < |T |,
then there is always an edge e in T but not in S which we can add to S without
creating a circle. For this example, the bases of (E, I) are the spanning trees of G.
For a strategy s of player i, let sˆ := {r ∈ R | s(r) > 0} be the set of all resources
used by s and let Sˆi = {sˆ | s ∈ Si} contain all such sets for a given player i. This
is a simplified version of the original strategy space of i, in which we only consider
which resources are used by a strategy and which are not, independent of the actual
demands.
Definition 2.21 (Matroid Budget Game). A matroid budget game B is a budget
game with the following properties:
• for all i ∈ N , all s, s′ ∈ Si and all r ∈ R, it holds that
s(r) 6= 0 ∧ s′(r) 6= 0⇒ s(r) = s′(r)
• Mi = (R, Ii) is a matroid for all i ∈ N and Ii = {x ⊆ s | s ∈ Sˆi}.
Matroid budget games are a more general form of singleton budget games. In
both, each strategy space Si consists of bases of a matroid Mi over the resources.
Therefore, every strategy of a player i uses the same number of resources. The
matroids can differ between the players, i.e.Mi 6=Mj for i 6= j may hold, which in
turn means that the players can choose between different sets of resources. Matroid
budget games have the very useful property that every strategy change can be
modeled as a sequence of lazy moves. A lazy move is a strategy change in which
only one resource is exchanged for another. Formally speaking, for sˆ, sˆ′ ∈ Sˆi with
|sˆ \ sˆ′| = |sˆ′ \ sˆ| = 1, we call the strategy change from s to s′ a lazy move. If
the switch from s to s′ is not a lazy move in itself, it can be decomposed into a
sequence (s = s0, s1, . . . , sm−1, sm = s′) in which the switch from st to st+1 is a
lazy move for t = 0, . . . ,m−1 and st ∈ Si for all t = 0, . . . ,m. Intuitively speaking,
player i is also able to perform the strategy change from s to s′ only partially, i.e.
exchange only some of the resources. This allows for much more filigree actions by
the players.
2.3 Ordered Budget Games
A large part of this thesis deals with so-called ordered budget games. These can be
regarded as a variation of the budget games introduced in the last section, as the
main principle is the same: if the total demand on a resource exceeds its budget, it
has to be shared between the responsible players. Here, temporal aspects are taken
into account when deciding how to split the budget. For every resource, there is an
order over the demands, which are satisfied sequentially until the budget is spent.
These orders are manipulated by the strategy changes of the players and ultimately,
the utility of a player not only depends on the current strategies, but also on prior
strategy profiles.
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Definition 2.22 (Ordered Budget Game). An ordered budget game B is a tuple
(N ,R, (br)r∈R, (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ), which consists of the following components:
• a set of players N = {1, . . . , n}
• a set of resources R = {1, . . . ,m}
• a budget br for each resource r
• a strategy space Si ⊆ 2Ti for each player i,
with Ti :=
{
t1i , . . . , t
qi
i
}
being the tasks of player i
and tki ∈ Rm≥0 for k = 1, . . . , qi
• an ordered utility function
ui : S1 × . . .× Sn ×
{
≺= (≺r)r∈R | ≺r total order on T =
⋃
i∈N
Ti
}
→ R
for each player i defined as
ui(s1, . . . , sn,≺) :=
∑
t∈si
∑
r∈R
ut,r(s1, . . . , sn,≺)
with
ut,r(s1, . . . , sn,≺) := min
t(r),max
0, br −∑
j∈N
∑
t′∈sj
t′≺rt
t′(r)


The main difference between ordered budget games and budget games is the
emphasis on the order of player decisions. How much utility a player receives from
a resource also depends on which other players chose the same resource before him.
The demands of the players are satisfied sequentially according to the first-come,
first-served principle. If the remaining budget of a resource is not enough to fulfill
the demand of a player, he only receives what is left of the budget and all subsequent
players obtain nothing. Since the utility now depends on more than just the current
strategies of all players, we extend the definition of a strategy profile.
Definition 2.23 (Strategy Profile). The strategy profile of an ordered budget game
is a tuple (s,≺), whereas s ∈ S1 × . . .×Sn and ≺ = (≺r)r∈R with ≺r being a total
order on T .
To make sure that a strategy change is still an attractive action to the players,
we introduce the concept of tasks. These represent a link between the resources
and the strategies as they are defined in budget games. A player chooses a strategy,
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which is a set of tasks, with each task being a vector of demands. This enables
us to handle small-scale strategy changes, in which a player does not drastically
change his whole strategy, but only adjusts parts of it. Let (s,≺) be a strategy
profile of an ordered budget game. When player i changes his strategy from si to
s′i, this does not only affect s, but ≺ as well. All new tasks tnew ∈ s′i \ si are moved
to the end of ≺r for all resources r ∈ R. If we write τ = s′i \ si, the new strategy
profile is ((s−i, s′i),≺′) with x ≺′r y if and only if x ≺r y for all x, y ∈ T \ τ and
x ≺′r tnew for all x ∈ T and tnew ∈ τ . The order of the new tasks in τ among
each other is arbitrary, as it does not change the utility function of player i (it
only determines how much of his utility is obtained through which task). All tasks
told ∈ s′i \ τ are unaffected by the strategy change regarding their position in ≺r for
any r. Therefore, player i is able to change some of his tasks without loosing the
utility generated by those who remain part of this strategy.
2.4 Additional Concepts
To conclude this chapter, we introduce a number of additional concepts which are
not directly related to game theory. They still appear in the following chapters,
mostly as tools used in the proofs.
Definition 2.24 (Submodular Functions). Let U be a set and u ∈ U . A function
f : 2U → R is submodular if
|f(X ∪ {u})− f(X)| ≥ |f(Y ∪ {u})− f(Y )|
for all X,Y ⊆ U with X ⊆ Y and u /∈ Y .
Suppose we add elements from U one after another to an initially empty set and
evaluate this set under f for each new element. f being submodular states that the
effect of any element u on the value of f does not increase over time.
Definition 2.25 (Monotone Functions). Let U be a set. A function f : 2U → R is
monotone if
f(X) ≤ f(Y )
for all X,Y ⊆ U with X ⊆ Y .
Under the same process described above for submodular functions, the value of
f does not decrease over time if the function is monotone.
Definition 2.26 (Lambert W function). Consider the function f : R → [−1e ,∞]
defined as f(x) := x · ex.
The functions W−1 := (f |(−∞,−1])−1 and W0 := (f |[−1,∞))−1 together are called
the Lambert W function and usually denoted by W (x).
The Lambert W function is actually defined over the field of the complex numbers.
In our context, however, it suffices to restrict its definition to R. Since f is not
injective, W is not an actual function. However, if it is split into W0 and W−1 then
these two branches of W are functions.
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Related Work
In this chapter, we give an overview of the existing literature related to budget
games. This mainly concerns congestion games and their variants, which are being
researched extensively up to this day. We also reference a number of other subjects
connected to the topics of this thesis.
3.1 Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion Games
In a congestion game, players choose among subsets of resources while trying to
minimize personal costs. The cost of a player is the sum of the costs of the chosen
resources. In the initial (unweighted) version introduced by Rosenthal [64], the
cost of each resource depends only on the number of players choosing that resource
and it is the same for each player using that resource. These games are exact
potential games [60] and therefore every best-response sequence of strategy profiles
is guaranteed to converge to a pure Nash equilibrium. Their exact potential function
is known as Rosenthal’s potential function [64].
Since then, congestion games and their variations have been researched exten-
sively. In weighted congestion games [58], each player has a fixed weight and the
cost of a resource depends on the sum of weights of the players using that resource.
This models the aspect that players with different demands, sizes, etc. have a dif-
ferent impact on the workload of a resource. Just like for unweighted congestion
games, the actual cost of a resource is the same for each player choosing it. For this
larger class of congestion games, Milchtaich [58] showed that pure Nash equilibria
can no longer be guaranteed. Ackermann et al. [1] determined that the structure
of the strategy spaces is a crucial property for the existence of pure Nash equilib-
ria. While a matroid congestion game always has a pure Nash equilibrium, every
non-matroid set system induces a game without it. Besides being a more realistic
assumption than unweighted congestion games, weighted congestion games have
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another, rather remarkable property. Milchtaich [59] discovered that every finite
game is isomorph to a weighted network congestion game. In a network congestion
game, the strategy space of each player corresponds to the set of all paths between
a source and a destination in an underlying graph. By identifying all graphs for
which every weighted network congestion game has a pure Nash equilibrium [59],
Milchtaich solved the topological equilibrium-existence problem first raised in [53].
Milchtaich also proposed another extension of congestion games with player-
specific payoff functions for the resources [58], which only depend on the number
of players using a resource, but are different from player to player. For singleton
strategy spaces, these games maintain pure Nash equilibria. Ackerman et al. [1]
showed that, again, every player-specific matroid congestion game has a Nash equi-
librium, while this is also a maximal property. Budget games share traits of both
weighted and player-specific congestion games. The impact of a player on a resource
is determined by the demand of his strategy, which can be regarded as his current
weight. The resulting utility gained from a resource differs between players with
different demands. The results by Ackerman et al. show that the structure of the
strategy spaces can play a major role in the existence of pure Nash equilibria. For
this reason, we take a closer look at both singleton and matroid budget games in
Chapter 7. However, there are other restrictions on weighted or player-specific con-
gestion games which restore pure Nash equilibria, namely on the cost functions of
the resources. Harks and Klimm [39] gave a complete characterization of the class
of cost functions for which every weighted congestion game possesses a pure Nash
equilibrium. The cost functions have to be affine transformations of each other as
well as be affine or exponential.
Mavronicolas and Monien [56] considered weighted congestion games in which
some of the weights are negative. Deciding if a given instance has a pure Nash
equilibrium is strongly NP-complete, unless the number of resources is not consid-
ered to be part of the input. Finally, Harks and Klimm [40] introduced a model
similar to ours in which each player not only chooses his resources, but also his
demand on them. Unlike our model, both decisions are independent of each other.
The resulting payoff of player is his utility minus the costs of the resources he has
chosen. His utility function only depends on his demand and is both non-decreasing
and concave, creating an incentive for higher demands. On the other hand, the cost
of a resource increase with the total demand on it. The results state that pure Nash
equilibria do exists if all cost functions are either exponential or affine. In the latter
case, these games also possess the finite improvement property. While this is more
of a continuous model (the demand of each player is a value from R), budget games
can be seen as a discrete version, as a player can have multiple strategies using the
same set of resources, but imposing different demands on them.
There is a huge amount of additional literature related to both weighted or player-
specific congestion games not listed here. With so much research dedicated to these
games, it was only natural to combine their two models at some point. Mavronico-
las et al. [55] introduced weighted congestion games with player-specific constants
and gave a detailed overview of the existence of pure Nash equilibria. In these
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Figure 3.1: A classification of budget games (b.g.) with respect to the field of con-
gestion games (c.g.). The figure illustrates the capacity of our model
regarding different impacts of the players. Since our utility functions
are fixed, budget games represent only one instance of player-specific
games with strategy-dependent weights.
games, the cost function ci,r of player i for resource r consists of a base function cr,
which depends on the weights of all players using r, as well as a constant ki,r, both
connected by abelian group operations. Later, Gairing and Klimm [30] character-
ized the conditions for pure Nash equilibria in general player-specific congestion
games with weighted players. Pure Nash equilibria exist, if and only if, the cost
functions of the resources are affine transformations of each other as well as affine or
exponential. The combination of player-specific cost functions and weighted players
in particularly emphasizes that the impact of the same strategic choice may vary
between the players. As already mentioned, budget games share properties of both
types of congestion games. They further extend these models by allowing multiple
weights per player, even for the same resource. In contrast to the majority of the
existing research mentioned so far, budget game use utility functions instead of cost
functions. Omitting this rather important difference, we are better able to embed
our model in the field of congestion games. Figure 3.1 shows that budget games are
part of the larger class of player-specific congestion games with strategy-dependent
weights. In this class, which to the best of our knowledge has not yet been formally
introduced, the discrete weights of the players are not fixed but instead are tied
directly to their strategies.
Besides the existence of pure Nash equilibria, we also focus on their complexity.
While congestion games have the finite improvement property, Fabrikant et al. [27]
showed that computing a pure Nash equilibrium is PLS-complete. This implies that
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the best-response dynamic can perform an exponential number of improving moves
until it terminates. In the case of weighted [25] or player-specific [2] congestion
games, it is generally NP-hard to decide if a pure Nash equilibrium exists. While
computing even strong pure Nash equilibria for ordered budget games is easy, find-
ing a super-strong pure Nash equilibrium is NP-hard. For some restricted instances
of strategic budget games, we also give efficient algorithms for finding pure Nash
equilibria. Computing the optimal solution of a budget game, strategic or ordered,
is again NP-hard.
The negative results regarding both existence and complexity of pure Nash equi-
libria lead to the study of approximate pure Nash equilibria. Chien and Sinclair [18]
showed that in symmetric unweighted congestions games and under a mild assump-
tion on the cost functions every sequence of (1+ε)-improving steps converge to pure
(1 + ε)-approximate Nash equilibria in polynomial time in the number of players
and ε−1. This result cannot be generalized to asymmetric games as Skopalik and
Vo¨cking [68] showed that computing approximate equilibria for these games is still
PLS-complete. However, for the case of linear or polynomial cost function Caragian-
nis et al. [12] presented an algorithm to compute approximate pure Nash equilibria
in polynomial time which was slightly improved in [29]. For strategic budget games,
a result similar to the one from [18] holds. It was shown that α-approximate pure
Nash equilibria with small values of α exist in weighted congestion games [37] and
that they can be computed in polynomial time [13], albeit only for a larger values
of α. Chen and Roughgarden [16] proved the existence of approximate equilibria
in network design games with weighted players. The results have been used by
Christodoulou et al. [20] to give tight bounds on the price of anarchy and price of
stability of approximate pure Nash equilibria in unweighted congestion games.
To quantify the inefficiency of equilibrium outcomes, the price of anarchy has
been thoroughly analyzed for exact equilibria. For unweighted congestion games
with linear cost functions [19], the price of anarchy is 5/2 for symmetric games and
Θ(
√
n) for asymmetric ones. Weighted congestion games have a price of anarchy of
2, 681 for linear cost functions and of dΘ(d) for polynomial cost functions of degree
at most d and with non-negative coefficients [8]. Aland et al. [4] later improved
these results. Recently, Awerbuch et al. [11] considered even more general classes
of cost functions. Since the price of anarchy is only meaningful if the players form
a common pure Nash equilibrium, Roughgarden [65] considered the connection
between classic pure Nash equilibria and more general concepts by using smoothness
arguments. Christodoulou et al. [20] also investigated the price of anarchy for
approximate pure Nash equilibria in (non-) atomic congestion games with linear
cost functions. They gave (almost) tight bounds, which encompass the former
results regarding exact pure Nash equilibria. We also give almost tight bounds
on the price of anarchy in budget games for both pure Nash equilibria as well as
approximate pure Nash equilibria.
Instead of bounding the time the best-response dynamic needs to reach a pure
Nash equilibrium, recent work also considered the convergence time to states with a
social welfare close to the optimum. The concept of smoothness was first introduced
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by Roughgarden [65]. Several variants such as the concept of semi-smoothness [54]
followed. Awerbuch et al. [9] proposed β-niceness, which was reworked in [7]. This
serves as the basis for the concept of nice games introduced in [6], which we also
use in Chapter 6.
Recently, Paes Leme et al. [49] introduced the sequential price of anarchy, which
measures the efficiency of pure Nash equilibria obtained when the players choose
their strategy one after another. De Jong et al. [23, 22] gave bounds on the sequen-
tial price of anarchy for different forms of congestion games. Although it is actually
better than the classic price of anarchy for some game classes, it is also unbounded
for linear symmetric routing games, which have a price of anarchy of 5/2. The se-
quential price of anarchy differs from what we consider as ordered budget games, as
it is still defined for strategic games while the latter are not strategic. Nevertheless,
it shows that the impact of introducing a sequential aspect to an existing model
can have various outcomes.
3.2 Modifications of the Congestion Games Model
Besides weighted players and player-specific cost functions, there are many other
modifications of the classic congestion game model. In this section, we list only a
few of them along with the relevant results.
Instead of assigning the whole cost of a resource to each player using it, it can
also be shared between those players, so that everyone only pays a part of it. Such
games are known as cost sharing games [43]. One method to determine the share of
each player is proportional cost sharing, in which the share increases with the weight
of a player. This is exactly what we are doing with budget games, but with utilities
instead of costs. Under proportional cost sharing, pure Nash equilibria again do
not exist in general [5]. Kollias and Roughgarden [48] took a different approach
by considering weighted games in which the share of each player is identical to
his Shapley value [67]. Using this method, every weighted congestion game yields
a weighted potential function. In addition, it minimizes the worst-case price of
anarchy [33] for guaranteed pure Nash equilibria. If the condition that a pure Nash
equilibrium always exists is dropped, proportional cost sharing is optimal regarding
price of anarchy among all cost sharing methods. Gairing et al. [31] further analyzed
the effects of the cost functions on the efficiency of cost sharing mechanisms. Further
research bounded the price of anarchy for different cost sharing mechanisms based
on the structure of the strategy spaces [70] or the underlying cost functions [17, 36].
Usually, these cost functions are anonymous, i.e. they only depend on the weights
of the players. Both Roughgarden et al. [66] and Klimm and Schmand [45] gave
(tight) bounds on the price of anarchy for non-anonymous cost functions, which are
defined over sets of players.
So-called set cover games mainly consist of a universe of elements and a number
of subsets. Every set has a cost and a multiplicity for each element, meaning
that it can cover an element more than once. Also, every element has a coverage
23
Chapter 3 RELATED WORK
requirement. Similar to budget games, this coverage requirement serves as an upper
bound on the availability of the elements. If it is exceeded by the number of covering
subsets, the additional subsets are ignored. In this context, different multiplicities
can be regarded as different demands. Li et al. [51] considered multiple versions of
these games, modeling different practical situations from a cooperative standpoint
and gave cost sharing mechanisms with different properties (budget-balanced, core,
group-strategyproof). Later [52], they focused on a version where the elements are
the players, placing bids on the subsets, and gave truthful mechanisms. Cardinal
and Hoefer [14] chose a non-cooperative approach and analyzed both exact and
approximate Nash equilibria in set cover games.
Another variation studied is the model of bottleneck congestion games [10]. In-
stead of considering the sum of all resource costs, the individual cost of a player is
given by the maximum of the costs of his resources. This is more suited for model-
ing data routing over links in series, as the total delay primarily depends on the link
with the highest congestion. Budget games, on the other hand, are more concerned
with routing over parallel links. Banner and Orda [10] showed that these games
always have a pure Nash equilibrium and gave first bounds on their efficiency, which
were improved later on [21, 63, 57]. Harks et al. [41] proved the existence of strong
pure Nash equilibria through the lexicographical improvement property, which we
also use in Chapter 7. Recently, the complexity of (strong) pure Nash equilibria in
bottleneck congestion games has been considered [38].
3.3 Additional Literature
To conclude this chapter, we briefly list a number of additional literature connected
to the topics of this thesis.
Budget games can be considered as a generalization of market sharing games [34],
in which players choose a set of markets in which they offer a service. Each market
has a fixed cost and each player a budget. The set of markets a player can service
is thus determined by a knapsack constraint. The utility of a player is the sum
of utilities that he receives from each market that he services. Each market has a
fixed total profit or utility that is evenly distributed among the players that service
the market. Market sharing games are potential games and therefore always posses
pure Nash equilibria.
Strategic budget games also satisfy the definition of basic utility games [69]. For
such games, the social welfare is both submodular and non-decreasing. We use
these properties to efficiently approximate the optimal solution in matroid budget
games (cf. Chapter 4). Vetta [69] showed that the price of anarchy of any basic
utility game is at most 2, which is tight for budget games as well as for ordered
budget games.
The field of location games was established by Hotteling [42]. In general, these
games are about choosing a location, e.g. in a market, to maximize payoff. The
existence of pure Nash equilibria in various forms of this class of games has been
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analyzed, such as positioning in a graph [46] or in a continuous interval [47]. Similar
to ordered budget games, Eiselt and Laporte discussed a sequential execution in
which the players choose their location one after another instead of simultaneously.
Recently, the focus shifted to facility location games [44], which were mainly con-
sidered as cooperative games with cost sharing mechanisms [35, 50, 24]. Vetta [69]
defined a potential game in which the players choose a position for their facilities
inside a market to offer a service to the customers. Every customer is willing to pay
a certain price while serving a costumer induces costs to the provider based on the
facility used. Further publications [15, 14] regarding this topic consider fractional
location games, in which the consumer can split their demand over multiple facili-
ties. In [3], Ahn et al. studied the Voronoi game in which two players alternately
choose their facilities. The space controlled by each player is determined by the
nearest-neighbor rule. They give a winning strategy for player 2, although player
1 can ensure that the advantage is only arbitrarily small.
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Basic Results
In this chapter, we prove that pure Nash equilibria generally do not exist in budget
games. This important result motivates our search for different kinds of equilibria
or in different forms of budget games in the later chapters. In addition, we show
that finding a strategy profile which maximizes the social welfare in NP-hard, both
in strategic as well as in ordered budget games.
4.1 Nonexistence of Pure Nash Equilibria in Budget Games
Our main concern regarding budget games in this thesis is the existence and the
properties of Nash equilibria. We start our analysis by showing that in general, a
budget game does not have a Nash equilibrium, even if a player may only demand
an arbitrarily small part of a resource’s budget. We define the budget game B0,
which lacks a Nash equilibrium and is also referred to in some of the following
chapters.
Definition 4.1. Let δ > 0 be arbitrary, but fixed. For δ < 1, choose σ > 0 and
n ∈ N0 such that σ ≤ δ and n · σ+ δ = 1. Choose γ > 0 such that γ < δ and γ > 1
iff δ > 1.
We define the δ-share budget game B0 as follows:
• N0 = {1, . . . , n+ 2}
• R0 = {r1, r2, r3, r4}
• br = 1 for r = r1, . . . , r4
• S1 = { s11 = (γ, δ, 0, 0), s21 = (0, 0, δ, γ) }
S2 = { s12 = (δ, 0, γ, 0), s22 = (0, γ, 0, δ) }
Si = { si = (σ, σ, σ, σ) } for i ∈ {3, . . . , n+ 2}
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1s1
1 s2
1
1s1
2 s2
2
1
1
γ
δ
δ
γ
γ
δ
δ
γ
Figure 4.1: The δ-share budget game B0 without a Nash equilibrium. The auxiliary
players are not shown. The circles represent resources, the numbers on
the inside their budgets. Strategies are depicted as squares and the
demand of a strategy on a resource is written next to an edge between
those two. If there is no edge between a strategy and a resource, then
the demand is 0.
The budget game B0 is depicted in Figure 4.1. We discuss an instance of B0 with
actual values for δ and γ in Section 6.1. The players 1 and 2 are the games actual
players, while the remaining players (if applicable) are auxiliary players. They only
have one strategy each and therefore do not have to be considered when looking for
a Nash equilibrium. These players exists only to guarantee that a resource’s budget
is not sufficient to satisfy the demands of all players. Due to the small size of the
game, it has only four different strategy profiles and we can individually analyze
the corresponding utilities of the players for each of them. The results are listed in
Table 4.1. There are only two different values for the utilities in the game:
• u1 := min(1, δ) + γ1+γ
• u2 := min(1, γ) + δ1+γ .
For γ, δ > 1, we immediately see that
u2 − u1 = 1 + δ
1 + γ
− 1− γ
1 + γ
=
δ − γ
1 + γ
> 0
since δ > γ. Otherwise we have γ, δ ≤ 1 and
u1 − u2 = δ − γ + 1− δ
1 + γ
= (δ − γ)
(
1− 1
1 + γ
)
> 0
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players strategy profiles
(s11, s
1
2) (s
1
1, s
2
2) (s
2
1, s
1
2) (s
2
1, s
2
2)
1 min(1, δ) + γ1+γ min(1, γ) +
δ
1+γ min(1, γ) +
δ
1+γ min(1, δ) +
γ
1+γ
2 min(1, γ) + δ1+γ min(1, δ) +
γ
1+γ min(1, δ) +
γ
1+γ min(1, γ) +
δ
1+γ
Table 4.1: Overview of the different strategy profiles and the corresponding utilities
of the budget game B0.
So depending on the value of δ (and ultimately the value of γ), one of the two
utilities is always larger than the other one. We define u+ := max(u1, u2) and
u− := min(u1, u2). In each strategy profile, the utility of one player is u− while
the utility of the other is u+. Due to game’s structure, the player with the smaller
utility can always switch his strategy in order to obtain the larger utility instead (cf.
Table 4.1). In the process, the utility of the other player is reduced from u+ to u−.
So in every strategy profile, the player with utility u− is not in an equilibrium, which
shows that B0 does not have a Nash equilibrium. This conclusion is completely
independent of the actual value of δ.
Corollary 4.2. For every δ > 0, there is a δ-share budget game without a Nash
equilibrium.
This result shows that we cannot expect any strategic budget game to have a
pure Nash equilibrium, thus motivating our further research regarding approximate
Nash equilibria and Nash equilibria under additional restrictions in the following
chapters.
4.2 Complexity of the Optimal Solution
To conclude this chapter, we prove that computing the optimal solution for both
ordered as well as strategic budget games is hard. In fact, these two problems are
equivalent. The only real difference between ordered budget games and strategic
budget games is the utility sharing mechanism of their utility functions, i.e. how
a resource’s budget is split if the total demand exceeds it. The concept of tasks,
which serves as a link between strategies and resources in ordered budget games
was only introduced to model partial strategy changes, which in turn affects the
utility of the players. So aside from the utility functions, strategic budget games
and ordered budget games are equivalent and one can easily be transformed into
the other, as we are going to show now.
Let B be a strategic budget game, i a player in B and si a strategy of i. By
introducing a single task t with t(r) = si(r) for every r ∈ R and redefining the
strategy to si = {t}, we get a strategy which fits the definition of an ordered budget
game. If we repeat this process for all players and all strategies, then the only thing
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which keeps B from being an ordered budget game is the definition of its utility
functions, which we can simply exchange. Note that the demand of player i in si
remains the same for every resource. Likewise, let B be an ordered budget game,
i a player in B and si a strategy of i. si consists of tasks t1, . . . , tq for q ≥ 1. By
removing these tasks from si and assigning their demands directly to the strategy,
i.e. setting si(r) =
∑q
j=1 tj(r) for every resource r, we turn si into the strategy of
a strategic budget game. Again, the demand imposed by si on r is not changed in
the process.
While the differences in their utility functions separate strategic budget games
and ordered budget games in most aspects, the concept of social welfare is equivalent
for both game variations. The utility functions only differ in the individual utilities
of the players, as they state how a resource’s budget is split between them if the
total demand is too large. However, they are both the same in regards to the social
welfare, i.e. how much utility is obtained by all players together. As a result, the
problem of computing the optimal solution for any budget game, be it strategic
or ordered, is essential the same. Instead of computing the optimal solution for
one variation (e.g. strategic budget games), we can always transform the game into
one of the other kind (e.g. ordered budget game) as described above and solve the
problem there. The optimal solution as well as its social welfare is one and the
same for both types of games.
Observation 4.3. Computing the optimal solution in a strategic budget game is
equivalent to computing the optimal solution in an ordered budget game.
For the rest of this chapter, we restrict our attention to ordered budget games.
However, all of the following results can be transfered over to strategic budget
games, as we just explained. Since the orders ≺ in a strategy profile (s,≺) of an
ordered budget game do not affect the social welfare, we abuse notation and omit
≺ for the rest of this chapter.
Theorem 4.4. Computing the optimal solution for an ordered budget game B is
NP-hard, even if the strategies and tasks of all players are identical and B is a
singleton ordered budget game.
Proof. We give a reduction from the maximum set coverage problem. An instance
I = (U ,W, w) is given by a set U , a set of subsetsW = {W1, . . . ,Wq} withWi ⊆ U
for i = 1, . . . , q and an integer w ∈ N. Every subset W ⊆ W with |W | ≤ w is a
solution for I, but finding the optimal solution, which is the subset such that the
number of elements covered by the sets in W is maximized, is known to be NP-hard.
From I, we create an ordered budget game B as follows:
• N = {1, . . . , w}
• R = U
• br = 1 for all r ∈ R
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• Si = T for all i ∈ N with T = {tW1 , . . . , tWq}
The demands are set according to
tWj (r) =
 1, if r ∈ Wj0, else
for all r ∈ R.
Given a strategy profile s of B, its social welfare u(s) is the number of resources
covered by at least one strategy in s, since all demands and all budgets are 1.
Resource r is covered by a strategy s = {tWk} if and only if there is a set Wk with
r ∈ Wk. So choosing a strategy for ever player corresponds to choosing w sets from
{W1, . . . ,Wq} and s also describes a solution for I. The social welfare of s is then
the number of elements covered by the corresponding solution for I.
On the other hand, every solution of I can be transformed into a strategy profile
of B by assigning each chosen setWk to one player i and setting si = {tWk}. Again,
the social welfare and the number of covered elements are the same. Therefore, the
problems of finding an optimal solution for B and finding an optimal solution for I
are equivalent.
As mentioned before, this result carries over to strategic budget games.
Corollary 4.5. Computing the optimal solution for a strategic budget game B
is NP-hard, even if the strategies of all players are identical and B is a singleton
budget game.
We have shown that it can be computationally hard to determine the optimal
solution of any budget game. On the other hand, we can can approximate it
up to a constant factor if the strategy spaces of the players adhere to a certain
structure, namely to the bases of a matroid. In that case, Algorithm 1 yields a
1 − 1e approximation of the optimal solution. To prove this, we first introduce a
different notation for the social welfare.
Algorithm 1 ApproxOptSolutionOrderedBGs
si ← ∅ for all i ∈ N . strategy of player i
Ti ← Ti for all i ∈ N . available tasks of player i
ki ← number of tasks in each of player i’s strategies
while
⋃
i∈N Ti 6= ∅ do
choose i ∈ N and t ∈ Ti such that
uˆ(
⋃
i∈N si ∪ {t}) ≥ uˆ(
⋃
i∈N si ∪ {t′}) for all t′ ∈
⋃
i∈N Ti
si ← si ∪ {t}
Ti ← Ti \ {t} ∪ {t′ ∈ Ti | no strategy in Si containing si ∪ {t′}}
return (s1, . . . , sn)
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Definition 4.6. Let B be an ordered budget game. We define uˆ : 2T → R≥0 with
uˆ(T ) =
∑
r∈R
min
(∑
t∈T
t(r), br
)
.
The function uˆ can be regarded as an extension of the social welfare of B. It does
not consider how the budgets of the resources are split between the players, but
only how much is obtained in total. In addition, uˆ is defined for any set of tasks,
not just valid strategy profile. Finally, uˆ has two important properties.
Lemma 4.7. The function uˆ is monotone and submodular.
Proof. We first show that uˆ is monotone. Let T ⊆ T and t′ ∈ T \ T .
uˆ(T ∪ {t′})− f(T ) =
∑
r∈R
(
min
(
t′(r) +
∑
t∈T
t(r), br
)
−min
(∑
t∈T
t(r), br
))
≥ 0
uˆ does not decrease as we add additional tasks, so it is monotone. Now assume
that uˆ is not submodular. Since uˆ is defined as a sum over the resources, there has
to be at least one resource r with
min
(∑
t∈S
t(r), br
)
−min
(∑
t∈T
t(r), br
)
<min
(
t′(r) +
∑
t∈S
t(r), br
)
−min
(
t′(r) +
∑
t∈T
t(r), br
)
for T ⊆ S ⊂ T and t′ ∈ T \ S. Since we add t′ to both T and S, the difference
between min
(
t′(r) +
∑
t∈S t(r), br
)
and min
(
t′(r) +
∑
t∈T t(r), br
)
cannot be larger
than the difference between min
(∑
t∈S t(r), br
)
and min
(∑
t∈T t(r), br
)
. Thus, no
such resource r exists, which means that f has to be submodular.
Greedy maximization of a submodular monotone function yields an approxima-
tion factor of at least 1 − 1e [62]. Algorithm 1 has the same approximation factor,
as the resulting strategy profile is constructed greedily by always choosing the task
which yields the highest increase in social welfare. For a matroid ordered budget
game, in which the strategies of the players are bases of matroids over their tasks,
this leads to a valid strategy profile s ∈ S. In addition, there can be no better ap-
proximation for the maximum set coverage problem than 1− 1e unless P = NP [28].
Since this problem can be reduced to finding the optimal solution of a budget game
B (cf. proof of Theorem 4.4), the approximation factor of 1− 1e is tight.
Corollary 4.8. In a matroid ordered budget game, greedy maximization of the
social welfare yields a strategy profile s ∈ S with
u(opt)
u(s)
≥ 1− 1
e
This bound is tight, provided P 6= NP.
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As mentioned before, this result holds for matroid strategic budget games, as well.
In a matroid strategic budget games, the strategy space of each player consists of
bases of a matroid over the resources.
Corollary 4.9. In a matroid strategic budget game, greedy maximization of the
social welfare yields a strategy profile s ∈ S with
u(opt)
u(s)
≥ 1− 1
e
This bound is tight, provided P 6= NP.
So although the computation of the actual optimal solution is not feasible, we
can achieve a constant approximation factor for matroid games using a simple
greedy approach. Matroid budget games have the property that the players enjoy
a lot of freedom when choosing their resources. Instead of deciding between given
combinations, a player i can, for example, choose mi resources from a subset Mi ⊆
R of all resources. Even if there are multiple subsets M1i , . . . ,Mkii and he is allowed
to choose mli many resources from M
l
i for l = 1, . . . , ki, then this fits the definition
of a matroid budget game.
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Pure Nash Equilibria in Ordered Budget
Games
In this chapter, we analyze the properties of ordered budget games, especially
regarding Nash equilibria. Ordered budget games can be viewed as an extension
of strategic budget games, as the major properties (variable demands even on the
same resource, social welfare bounded by the budgets) are the same. In addition,
ordered budget games also take chronological aspects into account, i.e. which player
performed which strategy change at which point in time. They are therefore not
strategic games. In a strategic game, the current state (and thus the corresponding
utilities of the players) only depends on the combined strategies of the players (the
strategy profile). This is the case in strategic budget games, for example. When
considering ordered budget games, however, this property no longer holds. If two
or more players perform a sequence of strategy changes, the outcome also depends
on the order in which these strategy changes are executed. The example sketched
in Figure 5.1 highlights this aspect. Suppose both players 1 and 2 change their
s1
2
5
s2
2
5 3 s2
3
s1
1
Figure 5.1: Example of an singleton ordered budget game in which the order of the
strategy changes determine the resulting utilities. In the current strat-
egy profile, the strategies of player 1 and 2 are s11 and s
3
2, respectively.
This is indicated by the thick border around the strategies.
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strategy to s21 and s
2
2, respectively. If player 1 is the first to act, then his new utility
will be 5, which conforms to the whole budget of the resource. As long as he does
not change his strategy a second time, this utility is guaranteed. As he leaves no
remaining budget for player 2 to obtain, the new utility of that player would be 0
after his own strategy change. So if (s,≺) is the strategy profile after both strategy
changes in this order, then u1(s,≺) = 5 and u2(s,≺) = 0. If, on the other hand,
player 1 changes his strategy after player 2, resulting in the strategy profile (s,≺′),
then the resulting utilities will be u1(s,≺′) = 2 and u2(s,≺′) = 3, as player 2 only
uses a part of the resource’s budget. Note that the strategy vector s is the same
in both outcomes. What does change is the ordering of the tasks, which in turn
leads to the different utilities for the two strategy profiles. Unlike strategic games,
the state of an ordered budget game also depends on previous strategy profiles. To
put it simply, the player who acts first always has an advantage in ordered budget
games, as his tasks have a higher priority regarding the orders in ≺. This qualifies
ordered budget games to model scenarios with both old and new players. While the
old players have already been established their position in the game and secured
their utilities, the new ones are unable to obtain any budget shares currently held
by other players. Instead, they integrate themselves in the current strategy profile
to gain as much of the remaining budgets as possible.
Normally, a strategy can consist of a number of different tasks. In all the figures
shown throughout this chapter, we consider only instances with single tasks in
each strategy. We can therefore adapt the graphical representation introduced in
Figure 4.1 and identify the tasks with their corresponding strategies. In general,
having multiple tasks as part of a single strategy enables players to perform strategy
changes without loosing all of their current utility. If a player changes his strategy
from s to s′, then the position of all tasks from s∪ s′ in the orders of ≺ remain the
same, so the utility generated by them does not decrease.
5.1 Existence & Complexity of Pure Nash Equilibria
A nice property of ordered budget games is that they are exact potential games,
which in turn means that they always have a Nash equilibrium. This becomes
apparent when considering the dynamic between the different players.
Lemma 5.1. In an ordered budget game B, the strategy change of a player i does
not decrease the utility of any other player j ∈ N \ {i}.
This result follows directly from the definition of ordered budget games. Note
that it actually holds for all strategy changes, not only improving ones.
Proof. Assume that the strategy change of player i decreases the utility which player
j receives from resource r. If we denote the strategy profile before the strategy
change by (s,≺) and the one after by (s′,≺′), this means uj(s,≺) < uj(s′,≺′). So
there has to be a task tj ∈ sj with a decrease in its utility from at least one resource
r, i.e. utj ,r(s,≺) < utj ,r(s′,≺′). This can only happen if total demand by all tasks
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t on r with t ≺′r tj and which are actually part of some players strategy in (s′,≺′)
is larger than the total demand in (s′,≺′) of tasks t with t ≺r tj . However, player
i is the only one who is changing his strategy (and therefore his current tasks) and
by definition of the ordered utility function, the order of all the tasks by the other
players among each other are unaffected. Finally, any new task ti ∈ s′i ⊆ si has the
property tj ≺′r ti. Therefore, we get utj ,r(s,≺) ≥ utj ,r(s′,≺′).
With this lemma, it becomes clear that the social welfare acts as an exact poten-
tial function for ordered budget games.
Theorem 5.2. Ordered budget games are exact potential games, with the social
welfare as an exact potential function.
Proof. Let (s,≺) be a strategy profile of an ordered budget game B. Assume that
(s,≺) is not a Nash equilibrium, so there is a player i who can still improve his
utility. Denote the resulting strategy profile by ((s−i, s′i),≺′). Since the strategy
change is an improving step for i, we get ui(s,≺) < ui((s−i, s′i),≺′) and according
to Lemma 5.1, uj(s,≺) ≤ uj((s−i, s′i),≺′) holds for all players j 6= i. So the social
welfare is a generalized ordinal potential function. To see that it is actually an
exact potential function, we make a case distinction. First, consider uj(s,≺) =
uj((s−i, s′i),≺′) for all j 6= i. In that case,
u((s−i, s′i),≺′)− u(s,≺) =
∑
j∈N
uj((s−i, s′i),≺′)− uj(s,≺)
= ui((s−i, s′i),≺′)− ui(s,≺)
which proves our point. If uj(s,≺) < uj((s−i, s′i),≺′) holds for some j 6= i. Then
this additional utility of player j formerly belonged to i, so the increase in their
utility does not increase the social welfare, which is why it is again an exact potential
function.
Since they are potential games, ordered budget games always have at least one
Nash equilibrium. In addition, because their potential function is also their social
welfare, this Nash equilibrium has to be super-strong.
Corollary 5.3. Let (opt,≺) be the optimal solution of an ordered budget game B.
Then (opt,≺) is a super-strong Nash equilibrium of B.
Proof. Assume that (opt,≺) is not a super-strong Nash equilibrium. In this case,
there is a coalition C of players such that if all players in C deviate from their
current strategy, at least one player i ∈ C increases his utility while the other
players j ∈ C \ {i} receive at least the same utility as before. Let ((opt−C , sC),≺′)
be the resulting strategy profile after the combined strategy changes of C. We
actually do not have to consider the structure of both ≺ and ≺′, as they do not
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influence the social welfare. According to Lemma 5.1, no player outside of C looses
any utility through the strategy changes of C.
u(opt,≺) = ui(opt,≺) +
∑
j∈C\{i}
uj(opt,≺) +
∑
j∈N\C
uj(opt,≺)
< ui((opt−C , sC),≺′) +
∑
j∈C\{i}
uj((opt−C , sC),≺′) +
∑
j∈N\C
uj((opt−C , sC),≺′)
= u((opt−C , sC),≺′)
This contradicts our assumption that (opt,≺) is the optimal solution. So it has to
be a super-strong Nash equilibrium.
According to Theorem 5.2, a Nash equilibrium of an ordered budget game can be
computed by simulating the best-response dynamic. As we will see later, this ap-
proach is not very efficient, since the number of improving steps can be exponential
in the games description length. Nevertheless, there are other, faster methods.
Theorem 5.4. A strong Nash equilibrium of an ordered budget game B can be
computed in n best-response steps.
Proof. We start with the initial strategy vector s0 = (∅, . . . , ∅). Intuitively speaking,
the players have not yet chosen any tasks. At this point, we do note care if ∅ /∈ Si
for some i ∈ N . We also do not have to consider the initial order ≺0 as the first
strategy change by any player only introduces new tasks. The players then choose
their best-response one after another according to an arbitrary order. For the sake
of simplicity, we assume that this order follows their indices and player i+1 chooses
his strategy right after player i for i = 1, . . . , n − 1. As stated by Lemma 5.1, the
utility of i is not decreased by the strategy choice of i+ 1 or any other subsequent
player.
After every player i has chosen a strategy si ∈ Si according to best-response, the
result is a valid strategy profile (s,≺) ∈ S. Furthermore, no player has an incentive
to deviate from his current strategy, as the utility he received the moment he chose
his strategy has not changed. So (s,≺) ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium. Regarding strong
Nash equilibria, note that player i can only increase his utility if a player j with
j < i deviates first. Using an induction argument, But it is not possible for player
1 to receive a higher utility in any strategy profile (he was the first player to choose
a set of tasks), so he will never participate in any coalition. By using an induction
argument, we see that (s,≺) has to be a strong Nash equilibrium.
Computing both Nash equilibria and strong Nash equilibria for ordered budget
games can be done in polynomial time. However, if we consider super-strong Nash
equilibria, the computation becomes more difficult.
Theorem 5.5. Computing a super-strong Nash equilibrium for an ordered budget
game B is NP-hard, even if the number of strategies and tasks per player is constant.
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Proof. We prove this theorem through reduction from the monotone One-In-Three
SAT problem. Instances of this problem have the form (U , C) with U = {x1, . . . , xn}
being a set of binary variables and C a set of clauses over U with c = xi ∨ xj ∨ xk,
xi, xj , xk ∈ U for each c ∈ C. The clauses in C are monotone, which means they do
not contain any negated literals. We therefore refer to these literals as variables.
The question whether there is a truth assignment φ : U → {0, 1} for a pair (U , C)
such that every clause c ∈ C contains exactly one variable with value 1 is NP-
complete and computing such a φ is therefore NP-hard [32].
From (U , C), we construct an ordered budget game B as follows. For every vari-
able xi ∈ U , we add a player i ∈ N with Ti = {0i, 1i} and Si = {{0i}, {1i}}. Every
clause cj ∈ C defines two resources rj,0, rj,1 ∈ R with bj,0 = 2 and bj,1 = 1. The
demands of the tasks are set to
0i(rj,0) =
 1, if xi ∈ cj0, else 1i(rj,1) =
 1, if xi ∈ cj0, else
All demands not covered by these rules are set to 0. Let ki be the number of clauses
that variable xi occurs in. Then each of the two tasks of player i has a demand
of 1 on ki many resources and a demand of 0 on all others. The highest utility
the player i can obtain is therefore also ki and the highest possible social welfare is
K =
∑
i∈N ki.
Now assume that there is a satisfying truth assignment φ for (U , C) which is
also valid (the one-in-three property holds). In that case, every player can obtain
his individual maximum utility ki. If φ(xi) = 0, let player i choose strategy {0i},
otherwise {1i}. φ has the one-in-three property, which means that in each clause,
only one variable is set to 1. Thus, every resource rj,1 is covered by exactly one task
1i and every resource rj,0 by exactly two tasks 0i and 0i′ . No resource experiences
a demand higher than its budget, so the order of the tasks has no influence. The
resulting strategy profile, simply called sφ, is a super-strong Nash equilibrium, as
it is not possible for any player to achieve a higher utility in any strategy profile.
If a satisfying truth assignment φ exists, sφ is also the only super-strong Nash
equilibrium in B. In any other state, all players could form a coalition and switch
to sφ without any player receiving a lower utility. On the other hand, a strategy
profile with a social welfare of K is a super-strong Nash equilibrium and can be
used to easily construct a satisfying truth assignment φ as described above. So
by computing any super-strong Nash equilibrium of B and determining its social
welfare, we immediately determine a satisfying truth assignment φ, provided it
exists, or find out that no such assignment exists at all. So computing a super-
strong Nash equilibrium is at least as hard as solving the One-In-Three 3SAT
problem.
We have seen that ordered budget games are potential games, with the social
welfare as their potential function. This automatically implies a guaranteed exis-
tence of (super-strong) Nash equilibria. While the computation of Nash equilibria
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and even strong Nash equilibria only takes a linear number of steps, super-strong
Nash equilibria are much harder to obtain, provided P 6= NP.
5.2 Efficiency of Pure Nash Equilibria
Now that we know that even super-strong Nash equilibria always exist, we are
interested in their efficiency, namely the price of stability and the price of anarchy.
We take another look at Corollary 5.3, which states that the optimal solution
is always a super-strong Nash equilibrium. This immediately lets us draw the
following conclusion.
Corollary 5.6. Let B be an ordered budget game. Then super-strong PoS(B) = 1.
We show that the price of anarchy for regular Nash equilibria is at most twice as
large as the price of stability, i.e. PoA(B) ≤ 2. This bound is almost tight in the
sense that we can get arbitrarily close to it.
Theorem 5.7. Let B be an ordered budget game. Then PoA(B) ≤ 2.
Proof. Let (s,≺) be a Nash equilibrium of B and (opt,≺′) be its optimal solution.
We denote with ≺i the order vector we obtain if player i switches to opti in the
strategy profile (s,≺). Equation 1 shows in detail how to obtain
u(s,≺) ≥ u(opt,≺′)− u(s,≺),
which proves our theorem. We discuss the mathematical conversion step by step.
In (5.1), the social welfare u(s,≺) of the Nash equilibrium is split into the in-
dividual utilities obtained by the tasks. The Nash inequality (5.2) states that no
player i can increase his utility through a unilateral strategy change, especially if
he would switch to the strategy opti.
For (5.3), we make a case distinction. Let Tr(s) and Tr(s−i, opti) be the total
demand on resource r under the combined strategies s and (s−i, opti) of all players,
respectively. If Tr(s−i, opti) ≤ br, then
∑
t∈si ut,r((s−i, opti),≺i) =
∑
t∈si t(r). For
Tr(s−i, opti) > br and Tr(s) > br, we get∑
t∈si
ut,r((s−i, opti),≺i) ≥ 0 = br −
∑
j∈N
∑
t′∈sj
ut′,r(s,≺)
Finally, if Tr(s−i, opti) > br but Tr(s) ≤ br, note that ut′,r(s,≺) = t′(r) for all j ∈ N
and t′ ∈ sj . The utilities cannot be increased any further, so all of the remaining
budget br under s is allocated to player i and∑
t∈si
ut,r((s−i, opti),≺i) ≥ br −
∑
j∈N
∑
t′∈sj
ut′,r(s,≺)
Equation (5.4) simply bounds t(r) ≥ ut,r(opt,≺′), as a utility can never exceed
its underlying demand. In (5.5), the set of all resources is partitioned into two
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∑
i∈N
ui(s,≺) =
∑
r∈R
∑
i∈N
∑
t∈si
ut,r(s,≺) (5.1)
≥
∑
r∈R
∑
i∈N
∑
t∈opti
ut,r((s−i, opti),≺i) (5.2)
≥
∑
r∈R
∑
i∈N
min
∑
t∈opti
t(r), br −
∑
j∈N
∑
t′∈sj
ut′,r(s,≺)
 (5.3)
≥
∑
r∈R
∑
i∈N
min
∑
t∈opti
ut,r(opt,≺′), br −
∑
j∈N
∑
t′∈sj
ut′,r(s,≺)
 (5.4)
=
∑
r∈R1
∑
i∈N
min
∑
t∈opti
ut,r(opt,≺′), br −
∑
j∈N
∑
t′∈sj
ut′,r(s,≺)

+
∑
r∈R2
∑
i∈N
∑
t∈opti
ut,r(opt,≺′) (5.5)
≥
∑
r∈R1
br −∑
j∈N
∑
t′∈sj
ut′,r(s,≺)
+ ∑
r∈R2
∑
i∈N
∑
t∈opti
ut,r(opt,≺′) (5.6)
≥
∑
r∈R1
∑
i∈N
∑
t∈opti
ut,r(opt,≺′)−
∑
j∈N
∑
t′∈sj
ut′,r(s,≺)

+
∑
r∈R2
∑
i∈N
∑
t∈opti
ut,r(opt,≺′) (5.7)
≥
∑
r∈R
∑
i∈N
∑
t∈opti
ut,r(opt,≺)−
∑
r∈R1
∑
j∈N
∑
t′∈sj
ut′,r(s,≺) (5.8)
≥
∑
i∈N
ui(opt,≺′)−
∑
r∈R
∑
j∈N
∑
t′∈sj
ut′,r(s,≺) (5.9)
=
∑
i∈N
ui(opt,≺′)−
∑
i∈N
ui(s,≺)
Equation 1: Bounding the social welfare of a Nash equilibrium in ordered budget
games, which always has at least half the social welfare of the optimal solution.
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disjoint subsets R1 and R2. R1 contains exactly those resources for which at least
one player evaluates the minimum statement to the second expression. We omit all
other players and restrict the formula to this special player in order to obtain (5.6).
The total utility gained from a resource by all players combined can never exceed
its budget, so we can lower bound br in (5.7). By re-combining the two sums (5.8)
and extending the sum over R1 to all resources in R (5.9), we obtain our result.
Although this proof only takes unilateral strategy changes into account (cf. (5.2)),
the result is also valid for both strong and super-strong Nash equilibria, since every
super-strong Nash equilibrium is also a strong Nash equilibrium and every strong
Nash equilibrium is also a Nash equilibrium. It remains to show that this bound is
almost tight.
Theorem 5.8. For every ε > 0, there exists an ordered budget game Bε with
PoA(Bε) = 2− ε.
Proof. Consider the game Bε, which is defined as follows:
• N = {1, 2}
• R = {r1, r2}
• b1 = 1 and b2 = 1− ε
• S1 =
{
s11 = {t11 = (1, 0)} , s21 = {t21 = (0, 1− ε)}
}
S2 = {s2 = {t2 = (1, 0)}}
Player 2 has only one strategy, so we focus on player 1. If the players choose different
resources, i.e. if player 1 plays strategy s21, then the social welfare is u((s
1
1, s2),≺
) = 1− ε+ 1 = 2− ε. This is also the optimal solution, as u(s21, s2,≺′) = 1. Both
statements are independent of the structure in ≺ and ≺′.
The strategy profile ((s11, s2),≺) with t21 ≺1 t2 (and the rest arbitrary) is a Nash
equilibrium, as the utility of player 1 is 1, which also is his personal maximum.
This leaves no remaining budget for player 2, so the social welfare is 1, as well. As
a result, the price of anarchy is
PoA(B) ≤ 2− ε
1
= 2− ε
Note that we can extend the game B to n instead of 2 players by using n2 separate
instances of this two-player game.
Our upper bound for the price of anarchy in ordered budget games is tight with
respect to any ε > 0 and the social welfare of any Nash equilibrium is at least half
as big as that of the optimal value.
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5.3 Properties of the Best-Response Dynamic
When simulating the best-response dynamic, it may happen that more than one
player is able to perform an improving move. If we want to allow multiple simul-
taneous strategy changes, we need an additional rule for the case that two or more
tasks of different players are newly allocated to the same resource. In strategic
games, such rules are not necessary as the outcome only depends on the strategies,
but not on the order in which these strategy choices were made. If multiple strat-
egy changes are executed simultaneously in a strategic budget game, the result is
identical to any sequential execution. This is different in ordered budget games as
already seen in Figure 5.1 at the beginning of this chapter and the reason why they
are not considered to be strategic games. On the other hand, one normally assumes
that there are no simultaneous strategy changes in strategic games, unless dealing
with coalitions of players, as they can easily lead to a cycle. With ordered bud-
get games, we have more possibilities regarding this matter, precisely because the
outcome can be influenced by choosing a sequential order for the strategy changes.
Since ordered budget games already possess the finite-improvement property, we
want make sure that this is retained.
We introduce two tie-breaking rules which guarantee that an ordered budget game
still converges towards a Nash equilibrium. Let p be a function that assigns a unique
priority to every player i. This priority can depend on the current strategy profile.
Whenever simultaneous strategy changes occur, they are executed sequentially in
decreasing order of the priorities of the players involved. If both player i and j
change their strategy with ti and tj being new tasks of i and j, respectively, then
we set ti ≺r tj for all resources r if and only if the priority of i is larger than the
priority of j before the strategy changes. p is called a priority function.
Definition 5.9 (Fixed Priorities). A injective priority function pfix of the form
pfix : N → N is called a fixed priority function.
When using a fixed priority function, the current strategy profile has no influence
on the priorities. Instead, they are directly associated with the players and do not
change over the course of the game.
Definition 5.10 (Utility-Based Priorities). A priority function pmax of the form
pmax : N × S× ≺→ N is called a utility-based priority function if
• ui(s,≺) < uj(s,≺)⇒ pmax(i, s,≺) < pmax(j, s,≺)
• pmax(i, s,≺) = pmax(j, s,≺)⇒ i = j
The first property states that a player with a higher utility also gets a higher
priority. The second property of this definition ensures that for any given strategy
profile, the priority function is still injective with respect to the players. If two or
more players have the same utility, the priorities among each other can be arbitrary.
The next result states that these two rules keep the finite-improvement property of
ordered budget games intact.
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Theorem 5.11. Let B be an ordered budget game which allows multiple simultane-
ous strategy changes. If B uses either pfix or pmax to determine the priorities of the
players, then it reaches a Nash equilibrium after finitely many improvement steps.
Proof. Let (s,≺) be the current strategy profile of B and ~u(s,≺) ∈ Rn≥0 the vector
containing the current utilities of all players. We call ~u(s,≺) the utility vector of
B under (s,≺). ~u(s) is sorted in decreasing order of the player priorities, i.e. the
player with his utility at position i has a higher priority than the player with his
utility at position i+ 1. For pmax, this order may change over time and the utility
vector is newly sorted whenever necessary.
Let N ⊆ N be the set of players who are simultaneously performing a strategy
change. Each player would improve his utility if he were the only player in N .
Let (s′,≺′) be the resulting strategy profile after all simultaneous strategy changes.
Using either pfix or pmax only influences ≺′. We show that ~u(s,≺) <lex ~u(s′,≺′) for
both priority functions, with <lex being the lexicographical order between the two
vectors.
Let i ∈ N be the player with the highest priority among those in N . For pfix, i
receives exactly the increase in utility he expected from the strategy change. From
all the players in N , he is also the one with the smallest index in both −→u (s) and−→u (s′). This already warrants that ~u(s,≺) <lex ~u(s′,≺′).
For pmax, the same argumentation holds if the position of i in the two utility
vectors does not change. Otherwise, his position in ~u(s,≺) is now occupied by a
player j with uj(s,≺) < ui(s′,≺′) < uj(s′,≺′). Again, we have ~u(s,≺) <lex ~u(s′,≺′).
Since the utility vectors are strongly monotonically increasing, but bounded by the
vectors containing the maximal utility of each player, a NE is reached after finitely
many steps.
The first section of this chapter has shown that the best-response dynamic yields
a strong Nash equilibrium after just n improving steps if we start with an empty
game and insert the players one after another. However, the situation is different
when the initial strategy profile can be arbitrary. To conclude this chapter, we
study how fast the best-response dynamic converges in general. The number of
improving steps before a Nash equilibrium is reached can be exponential in the
number of players, even if the number of strategies per player is constant.
Theorem 5.12. Let n ∈ N. There is an ordered budget game Bn with a descrip-
tion length polynomial in n and a strategy profile (sn0 ,≺n0 ) such that the number of
best-response improvement steps from (sn0 ,≺n0 ) to a Nash equilibrium (snNE,≺nNE) is
exponential in n.
For the following proof, we assume that pfix is used as a priority function for
simultaneous strategy changes, with the indices of the players as their priorities.
Proof. We give a recursive construction of the game Bn. It contains the sub-game
Bn−1, for which there is exactly one path of best-response improvement steps with
length O(2n−1) if (sn−10 ,≺n−10 ) is the initial strategy profile. Bn−1 is executed once,
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meaning that the players follow this best-response path until they reach a Nash
equilibrium. After that, the sub-game is reseted to its original state and then
executed once more along the same path. In the end, Bn has reached a Nash
equilibrium after O(2n) steps.
Each player i has only two tasks and he can choose exactly one of them, i.e.
Si = {{t1i }, {t2i }}. By labeling the strategies of player i with 0i and 1i, each strategy
profile can be written as a binary number. The initial strategy profile (sn0 ,≺n0 ) can
be regarded as 0 (with leading zeros) and the first execution of Bn−1 counts this
number up to 2n−1 − 1. The reset of Bn−1 then corresponds to increasing that
number by 1 to 2n−1 and the second execution of Bn−1 continues counting it up to
2n − 1. In the resulting Nash equilibrium of Bn, every player i plays strategy 1i.
Since the strategies only contain single tasks, the ordering of these tasks is also
an ordering of the players, so we can abuse notation and say i ≺ j for players i and
j in a strategy profile ((. . . , si, . . . , sj , . . .),≺) if ti ≺r tj , ti ∈ si and tj ∈ sj , holds
for any (and therefore all) resource r.
In the following construction, the demand of any task t on any resource r is
either br or 0. Since we use a construction in this proof, we can simply say that t
is connected to r in the first or not connected to r in the second case. Due to this
property, there is always at most one player who receives a positive utility from a
resource.
We also need some additional notations for our proof. The only Nash equilibrium
that is reached in our construction of Bn is the state where every player i plays
strategy 1i and in which the players reach their final state in descending order, i.e.
i ≺ j for j < i. Let pqi be the utility of player i in the Nash equilibrium of the
sub-game Bq, q ∈ N. Also, let (sn0 ,≺n0 ) be the initial strategy profile of the game.
In ≺n0 , let i ≺ j for j < i. Intuitively, this means that players with a higher index
value also have a higher priority in the beginning.
We can now start with the construction of Bn. For n = 1, we build an instance
B1 with a single player:
• N1 = {1}
• R1 = {r1, r2}
• b1 = 1 , b2 = 2
• S1 = {01 = {t01 = (1, 0)} , 11 = {t11 = (0, 2)}}
The initial strategy profile is s10 = (01,≺10) with only one choice for ≺10 as there is
only one player. After one improvement step, B1 has reached a Nash equilibrium.
For n > 1, we extend the preexisting game Bn−1. This is done in two parts.
First, we explain how to reset Bn−1 to (sn−10 ,≺n−10 ). Let m denote the number
of all players in Bn−1. We introduce a new player n and a number of additional
resources:
• N ′n = Nn−1 ∪ {n}
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• R′n = Rn−1 ∪ {r01, . . . , r0m} ∪ {r11, . . . , r1m} ∪ {r21, . . . , r2m} ∪ {r, r′}
• br = 1 for r ∈ {r01, . . . , r0m, r11, . . . , r1m}
br = p
n−1
i + 2 for r ∈ {r20, . . . , rm0 , r21}
br = n− 2
br′ =
∑m
i=1 p
n−1
i + 2m
• Sn = {0n = {t0n} , 1n = {t1n}}
For i = 1, . . . , n − 1, we connect r0i to task t0i and r1i to task t1i . Therefore, every
task in Bn−1 gets an (for now) exclusive resource. Since the budgets of these
resources are the same, they do not influence the best-response dynamic in Bn−1.
We also connect all r0i to t
1
n and r to t
0
n. The initial strategy profile is (s
n
0 ,≺n0 ) with
sn0 = (s
n−1
0 , 0n) and ≺n0 being identical to ≺n−10 , with player n having the highest
priority among all players. His corresponding utility is un(s
n
0 ,≺n0 ) = n − 2, since
his current task is only connected to resource r. If he would change his strategy
now, his utility would become 0, since the whole budget of every resource connected
to t1n is already being obtained by a different player. Only when all other players
i = 1, . . . , n − 1 play strategy 1i = {t1i } player n can increase his utility by 1 by
switching to strategy 1n = {tn1}. This happens exactly when the best-response
dynamic has reached a Nash equilibrium for Bn−1.
This alone does not yet reset the sub-game Bn−1. As the next step, we further
extend the current game such that once player n has switched to 1n, all other play-
ers i = 1, . . . ,m switch their strategy back to 0i in order to recreate (s
n−1
0 ,≺n−10 ).
To achieve this, we introduce some additional connections between already existing
tasks and resources. For i = 1, . . . ,m, connect each task t0i to resource r
2
i . Addi-
tionally, connect the task t0n to every resource r
2
i . Since player n has the highest
priority of all players, he receives the total budgets of all resources r2i , yielding an
additional utility of
∑m
i=1 p
n−1
i + 2m =: Σ1. Finally, we connect task t
n
1 to resource
r′. Thus, player n has the same increase in utility for strategy 1n. No strategy of
any other player uses r′, which means that player n is guaranteed to receive that
resource’s budget. Since we increased the potential utility of both 0n and 1n, the
behavior of player n is not affected. However, as soon as he switches to 1n, all
the budgets of the resources r2i become available again. This will cause the players
1, . . . ,m to change their strategies back to 0i (just like in the initial strategy pro-
file), increasing their utility from pn−1i + 1 to at least p
n−1
i + 2. All these strategy
changes can occur simultaneously. By using pfix as a priority function, we ensure
that the order of the players is again ≺n−10 . The construction up to this point is
illustrated in Figure 5.2.
To restart the game Bn−1, we apply a similar trick as before. Just like the
strategy change of player n caused Bn−1 to reset, we introduce an auxiliary player
auxn, whose strategy change will start Bn−1 a second time. We extend the current
version of Bn as follows:
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• Nn = N ′n ∪ {auxn}
• Rn = R′n ∪ {r31, . . . , r3n} ∪ {r41, . . . , r4n} ∪ {r51, . . . , r5n−1} ∪ {rauxn}
• br = 1
br = p
i
n−1 + 2
brauxn = m+
∑m
i=1 p
i
n−1 =: Σ2
• Sauxn = {0auxn = {t0auxn} , 1auxn = {t1auxn}}
We connect t0aux to all r
5
i , i = 1, . . . , n − 1. The initial strategy of auxn is 0auxn
and we set auxn ≺ n in (sn0 ,≺n0 ). Initially, the auxiliary player has a utility of
Σ1 = 2m +
∑m
i=1 p
n−1
i . We also connect t
1
auxn to r
auxn and to all resources r3i for
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m, n}. Finally, for every player i = 1, . . . ,m, we connect r4i to t0i , r3i to
t1i and r
5
i to t
1
i . For player n, we establish these connections the other way around,
such that r3n is connected to t
0
n and r
4
n to t
1
n.
Again, the effects of r3i and r
4
i regarding Bn−1 cancel out. Only when every player
i in Bn−1 plays strategy 0i and player n plays strategy 1n, the auxiliary player will
switch to 1auxn and obtain a utility of
∑m
i=1 p
i
n−1 + 2m+ 1 = Σ2 + 1. This frees the
budget of all resources r5i and the utility of every strategy 1i in Bn−1 is increased by
the same amount we increased the utility of 0i in the first part of our construction.
The effects which originally reseted Bn−1 are now canceled out by the additional
resources and the game Bn−1 is executed once more, only player n remains idle.
When every players i in Bn is playing strategy 1i, the game has reached a Nash
equilibrium. Figure 5.3 illustrates this second part of the construction.
By construction, the number of improvement steps between the initial strategy
profile (sn0 ,≺n0 ) and the Nash equilibrium is doubled when stepping from Bn−1 to
Bn. Counting the auxiliary players, we see that |Nn| = 2·n−1. For every player, we
have only two tasks and two strategies. Finally, the number of resources introduced
to Bn−1 in order to construct Bn is linear in n. In the end, the description length
of Bn is polynomial in n.
Since ordered budget games emphasizes the order of strategy changes, letting the
players form a Nash equilibria on their own is more complicated than in strategic
budget games. Computing a Nash equilibrium is easy according to Theorem 5.4.
However, if the game starts in an arbitrary strategy profile s0, the best-response
dynamic may need exponentially long to actually reach it. Due to the structure
of the utility functions, it is not sufficient for all players to simple assume their
strategies in the corresponding Nash equilibrium all at once, as the outcome also
depends on s0 and on the priority functions.
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Figure 5.2: First part of the extension of the preexisting game Bn−1. Once the
players in Bn−1 have formed their Nash equilibrium, player n performs
a strategy change from t0n to t
1
n, which in turn resets Bn−1 to its original
strategy profile, i.e. other player i switches back to strategy t0i . We
define Σ1 := 2m+
∑m
i=1 p
i
n−1.
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Figure 5.3: Second part of the extension of the preexisting game Bn−1. Once player
n has switched to t1n and Bn−1 has been reseted to its original strategy
profile, the player aux switches to t1aux, which starts another execution
of the best-response dynamic of Bn−1. We define Σ2 := m+
∑m
i=1 p
i
n−1
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Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in
Budget Games
By now, we already know that a budget game does not necessarily have a Nash
equilibrium (cf. Definition 4.1 and Corollary 4.2). Since we are still interested in
finding stable states, we turn towards approximate equilibria. In an α-approximate
Nash equilibria, no unilateral strategy change increases the utility of the corre-
sponding player by more than some fixed factor α ≥ 1. This can be motivated by
the fact that players usually do not care for very small improvements, especially
if the current strategy profile is somewhat stable. By deviating from his current
strategy, a player could destroy this stability and cause additional strategy changes
by the other players. This process may then ultimately harm him. When consid-
ering approximate Nash equilibria, we expect a player to only change his strategy
if this yields a significant improvement.
In this chapter, we focus on the existence and properties of approximate Nash
equilibria in (strategic) δ-share budget games. In some cases, the value of δ does
not affect our results. We then omit the δ and use only the term budget game.
One of the two main aspects of our model is the distribution of budgets. If the
number of players or their demands are too small, we lose this aspect, as then there
can then be no situations in which the total demand on a resource actually exceeds
its budget. In this case, computing a Nash equilibria is equivalent to computing
the optimal solution and both can be done efficiently through greedy maximization
of the social welfare.
Lemma 6.1. Let B be a δ-share budget game with n players. If nδ ≤ 1, the optimal
solution of B is its only Nash equilibrium and can be computed in O(n ·m).
Proof. By definition, the demand of player i on resource r is at most δbr for any
strategy si. Since this holds for all players, the total demand Tr(s) is at most nδbr for
any strategy profile s. The assumption nδ ≤ 1 yields Tr(s) ≤ nδbr ≤ br. The total
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demand on r under s does not exceed its budget, so every player receives exactly his
demand. This holds especially for the strategy profile opt = (sopt1 , . . . , s
opt
n ) with
sopti := maxs∈Si
(∑
r∈R s(r)
)
, which is both a Nash equilibrium and maximizes
social welfare. To compute opt, it therefore suffices to determine sopti for every
player i. Any other strategy profile where player i receives a smaller utility than
in sopti cannot be a Nash equilibrium, as a switch to s
opt
i would always increase his
utility to
∑
r∈R s
opt
i (r).
From now on, we always assume nδ > 1, as the other case does not require us to
resort to approximate Nash equilibria.
6.1 Bounds on the Existence of Approximate Pure Nash
Equilibria
To start our analysis of approximate Nash equilibria, we take another look at the
δ-share budget game B0 from Definition 4.1. This time, we set δ = 1 and γ = 12 .
With these values, we do not need any auxiliary players and thus set σ = 0 and
n = 0. The resulting game is shown in Figure 6.1. The two possible utilities
are u− = 76 and u
+ = 43 , with u
+ ≤ α · u− for α ≥ 87 . So if we choose α large
enough, the player with the smaller utility of u− is unable to improve his utility
by more than this constant factor. In other words, B0 has an α-approximate Nash
equilibrium for every α > 87 . In fact, every strategy profile is such a stable state.
It becomes apparent that every strategy profile of every budget game can become
an α-approximate Nash equilibrium if we just choose α large enough. On the other
hand, B0 also illustrates that there may not be an α-approximate Nash equilibrium
if α is too small, in this case α ∈ [1, 87]. If we alter the demands and set δ = 34 and
γ = 12 as well as introduce auxiliary players as described in the definition of B0,
approximate Nash equilibria already exist for α > 1312 . So for every budget game B,
there has to be a threshold αδ based on δ such that B has an α-approximate Nash
equilibrium for α > αδ and has none for α ≤ αδ.
In this section, we give both upper and lower bounds on αδ, which both depend
on δ. We first introduce an approximate potential function for budget games, which
will be our main tool throughout this chapter.
Definition 6.2. Let φ(s) :=
∑
r∈R φr(s) with
φr(s) :=
 Tr(s) if Tr(s) ≤ brbr + ∫ Tr(s)br brx dx else.
We call φ an approximate potential function for budget games.
While φ(s) stands for the total potential of the game under s, φr(s) is considered
to be the potential of the individual resource r. We now use φ to give an upper
bound on the threshold for the guaranteed existence of approximate Nash equilibria.
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Figure 6.1: A budget game without a Nash equilibrium. For α ≥ 87 , however, every
strategy profile is an α-approximate Nash equilibrium.
Our goal is to find the smallest value for α such that φ still increases with every
α-move. Then, φ is a generalized ordinal potential function for budget games.
Definition 6.3. Let δ > 0 and W−1 denote the lower branch of the Lambert W
function. For convenience, we define
wδ :=
(
−1
2
W−1
(
−2e(−δ)−2
))
.
We then define the upper bound αuδ on αδ as
αuδ :=
wδ
δ
· (ln(w)− w + δ + 1) .
αuδ will be our upper bound on αδ, as stated by the following theorem.
Theorem 6.4. Let δ > 0 and B be a δ-share budget game. For α ≥ αuδ , B reaches
an α-approximate Nash equilibrium after a finite number of α-moves.
Proof. For strategy profile s and resource r, define T−i,r(s) := Tr(s) − si(r) as the
total demand on r under s excluding that of player i. Furthermore, let φr(s−i) be
the potential of r omitting the demand of player i, i.e.
φr(s−i) :=
 T−i,r(s) if T−i,r(s) ≤ brbr + ∫ T−i,r(s)br brx dx else.
With this definition, φi,r(s) := φr(s)−φr(s−i) determines how much of r’s potential
is caused by player i if we regard the impact of the players one by one, with player
i being considered last (cf. Figure 6.2).
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f ( x)= b
x
T r (s)br
1
f (x )=
br
x
Figure 6.2: The potential of r split over the players. As the potential only depends
on the total demand, we can construct it considering player by player.
The width of each segment equals the demand of that player.
f ( x)= b
x
T r (s)br
1
f (x )=
br
x
Figure 6.3: Following the same order of the players as in Figure 6.2, the utilities of
each player the moment he is added to the resource can be visualized.
In this example, the first three players together do not yet exceed the
budget of the resource. Once the fourth player is added, the utility
of the other three is reduced. However, this is not recorded in the
representation above. The same holds for all decreases in utility after
a player was added to the resource. Note that the actual utility of the
last player added to the resource is also the one shown in the figure.
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Note that ui,r(s) ≤ φi,r(s) always holds, as can be seen in Figure 6.3. We are
going to show that any strategy change of a player i, which improves his utility
by a factor of at least αuδ , also results in an increase of φ This implies that the
game does not possess any cycles and thus always reaches an α-approximate Nash
equilibrium after finitely many steps.
For now, assume
α ≥ max
i∈N
r∈R
(
φi,r(s)
ui,r(s)
)
, (6.1)
which trivially implies φi,r(s) ≤ α · ui,r(s) ∀ i ∈ N , r ∈ R. Assume that under the
strategy profile s, player i changes his strategy from si to s
′
i, increasing his overall
utility by a factor of more than α in the process. We obtain
∆φ = φ(s−i, s′i)− φ(s)
=
∑
r∈R
φi,r(s−i, s′i)−
∑
r∈R
φi,r(s)
≥
∑
r∈R
ui,r(s−i, s′i)− α ·
∑
r∈R
ui,r(s)
= ui(s−i, s′i)− α · ui(s)
> α · ui(s)− α · ui(s)
= α · (ui(s)− ui(s)) = 0.
We see that φ indeed grows with every α-move. It remains to be shown that our
upper bound αuδ satisfies Condition 6.1, i.e.
αuδ ≥ max
i∈N ,r∈R
(
φi,r(s)
ui,r(s)
)
.
We make a case distinction based on the size of T−i,r(s) and look at the two cases
T−i,r(s) < br and T−i,r(s) ≥ br. From now on, we consider both r and s to be
arbitrary, but fixed, and simply write t−i instead of T−i,r(s) and si instead of si(r).
The first case we look at is t−i < br. Note that we can assume t−i + si > br,
because otherwise the ratio between potential and utility of i at r would be 1. For
t−i + si > br, the ratio looks as follows:
φi,r(s)
ui,r(s)
=
br − t−i +
∫ t−i+si
br
br
x dx
br·si
t−i+si
= (t−i + si) · br − t−i + br (ln(t−i + si)− ln(br))
br · si
= (t−i + si) ·
br − t−i + br · ln( t−i+sibr )
br · si
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First we show that this ratio does not decrease as si grows larger. Its derivative by
si is
∂
∂ si
φi,r(s)
ui,r(s)
=
br(si − t−i)− br · t−i · ln
(
t−i+si
br
)
+ t2−i
(br · si)2 .
The numerator can be bounded by
br(si − t−i)− br · t−i · ln
(
t−i + si
br
)
+ t2−i
= br(si − t−i)− br · t−i · ln
(
1 +
t−i + si − br
br
)
+ t2−i
≥ br(si − t−i)− br · t−i · t−i + si − br
br
+ t2−i
= br · si − br · t−i − t2−i − si · t−i + br · t−i + t2−i
= br · si − si · t−i = si(br − t−i) > 0.
and so the original ratio gets only worse for bigger values of si. From now on, we
substitute si by its upper bound δbr. Now we determine the worst-case value for
t−i. The derivative by t−i is
∂
∂ t−i
φi,r(s)
ui,r(s)
=
br · ln
(
t−i+δbr
br
)
+ 2br − 2t−i − δbr
δb2r
.
We are looking for the root of this function.
br · ln
(
t−i + δbr
br
)
+ 2br − 2t−i − δbr = 0
⇔ ln
(
t−i + δbr
br
)
= 2
t−i
br
+ δ − 2
⇔ t−i + δbr
br
= e2
t−i
br · eδ−2
⇔ (−2) t−i
br
− 2δ = (−2)e2
t−i
br · eδ−2
⇔
(
−2 t−i
br
− 2δ
)
· e(−2)
t−i
br
−2δ = (−2)e(−δ)−2
⇔ (−2) t−i
br
− 2δ = W−1
(
−2e(−δ)−2
)
⇔ t−i =
(
−1
2
)
brW−1
(
−2e(−δ)−2
)
− δbr
⇔ t−i = br(w − δ) for w =
(
−1
2
W−1
(
−2e(−δ)−2
))
W−1 denotes the lower branch of the Lambert W function, which is used since
br < t−i + si = t−i + δbr and therefore the value W = (−2) t−ibr − 2δ < (−2)
br(1−δ)
br
−
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2δ = −2 < −1. Using the obtained values for both si and t−i, the worst-case ratio
between the potential caused at a resource r and the actual utility is
αuδ = w ·
ln(w)− w + δ + 1
δ
for w =
(
−1
2
W−1
(
−2e(−δ)−2
))
.
For t−i > br(w − δ), the ratio we seek only becomes smaller as t−i grows. This
especially holds for t−i ≥ br, when the ratio between potential and utility becomes
φi,r(s)
ui,r(s)
=
∫ t−i+si
t−i
br
x dx
br·si
t−i+si
= (t−i + si)
ln(1 + sit−i )
si
.
and which reaches its maximum for t−i = br and si = δbr. By determining the
individual derivatives by si and t−i, one can see that this function is non-decreasing
for growing si and non-increasing for growing t−i. So we obtain the worst-case ratio
for si = δbr and t−i = br, which is
φi,r(s)
ui,r(s)
= ln(1 + δ)
(1 + δ)
δ
≤ αuδ .
Therefore, αuδ is indeed the worst-case ratio and thus satisfies Condition 6.1.
Theorem 6.4 gives us an upper bound αuδ on the threshold αδ such that every
budget game has an α-approximate Nash equilibrium for α ≥ αuδ . Furthermore,
they also satisfy the finite improvement property above this threshold and an ap-
proximate Nash equilibrium can be computed simply by using the best-response
dynamic. Note that this does not say anything about the number of α-moves and
thus about the complexity of finding an approximate equilibrium. In Table 6.1,
we list some rounded values for αuδ in relation to the corresponding δ. Before we
further discuss this result, we also introduce a lower bound αlδ for αδ. Just like
before, we give the bound first and then show that it is actually correct.
Definition 6.5. Let δ > 0. We define the lower bound αlδ on αδ as
αlδ :=
2
√
δ2(δ + 2) + δ − 1
4δ − 1 .
Theorem 6.6. Let δ > 0 and α < αlδ. There is a δ-share budget game without an
α-approximate Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We once more refer to the δ-share budget game B0 from Definition 4.1. If
we fix δ, the ratio between u− and u+ becomes a function f in γ.
f(γ) :=
δ + γδ+γ+n·σ
γ + δδ+γ+n·σ
=
γ + δ(δ + γ + n · σ)
δ + γ(δ + γ + n · σ) =
γ + δ(γ + 1)
δ + γ(γ + 1)
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δ αuδ α
l
δ
0.1 1.0485 1.0170
0.2 1.0946 1.0335
0.3 1.1388 1.0497
0.4 1.1816 1.0656
0.5 1.2232 1.0811
0.6 1.2637 1.0964
0.7 1.3033 1.1114
0.8 1.3422 1.1261
0.9 1.3804 1.1405
1 1.4181 1.1547
Table 6.1: Upper and lower bounds for αδ derived from δ.
Deriving f with respect to γ yields
f ′(γ) =
δ2 − δγ(γ + 2)− γ2
(δ + γ2 + γ)2
= 0 for γ0 =
√
δ3 + 2δ2 − δ
δ + 1
and this is the only local maximum of f for γ > 0, so
f(γ0) =
2
√
δ2(δ + 2) + δ − 1
4δ − 1 = α
l
δ.
Table 6.1 also contains rounded values for αlδ. The larger we choose δ, the more
the upper bound αuδ increases. In addition, the gap between α
u
δ and α
l
δ grows
bigger as well. For smaller values of δ, however, our results become better. In
fact, we get limδ→0 αuδ = 1 (cf. Figure 6.4). Depending on the situation modeled
by budget games, small values for δ can be quite appropriate. Thinking back to
our motivation, assume the resources to be servers, with their budget standing for
their computational power, i.e. the amount of work they are able to process at a
given time. The players represent the clients who want to allocate their jobs on the
servers. In a δ-share budget game with δ = 1, we allow a single client to fully occupy
a whole server. In reality, however, these are able to handle several ten-thousand
of requests at once, which mirrors in a small value for δ which is actually close to
0. Under these considerations, our bounds are almost tight and the corresponding
approximate Nash equilibria are almost exact Nash equilibria.
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Figure 6.4: Upper bound f(δ) := αuδ for δ ∈]0, 1]. The smaller we choose δ, the
closer αuδ is to 1, i.e. limδ→0 α
u
δ = 1.
6.2 Efficiency of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria
In Chapter 4, we explained that the main difference between the two kinds of budget
games is how the budgets of the resources are distributed among the players. The
social welfare is not affected by these different utility functions. Thus, it seems
likely that results regarding the efficiency of Nash equilibria carry over from ordered
budget games. In this section, we show that this is indeed the case and moreover
how the price of anarchy for α-approximate Nash equilibria relates to the value
of α. For the rest of this section, let PoAα(B) denote the price of anarchy for
α-approximate Nash equilibria of a budget game B.
Theorem 6.7. Let B be a budget game. Then PoAα(B) ≤ α+ 1.
For this result, we do not need to consider the actual value of δ, as our proof is
independent of it. Its structure is similar to the corresponding proof for ordered
budget games (cf. Theorem 5.7).
Proof. Let s be an α-approximate Nash equilibrium of a budget game B and opt be
the strategy profile with the maximum social welfare. We lower bound the social
welfare of s in Equation 2. Large parts of the transformation are similar to the
proof of Theorem 5.7, so we resort to discussing the differences.
Equation (6.2) follows from the Nash inequality with respect to α and (6.3) from
the definition of the utility functions in budget games. In (6.4), we modify how the
utilities are computed and switch to a rule set akin to ordered budget games. The
distributions of the utilities in s are not affected, but if player i would now change
his strategy, this would no longer reduce the utility of any other player. If the
remaining budget of a resource is not sufficient to satisfy the new demand of i, then
he only receive what is left of that budget. In the context of ordered budget game,
this is equivalent to i having only one task in each strategy. With this modified
utility function, any strategy change by i yields at most as much utility as it would
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∑
i∈N
ui(s) =
∑
r∈R
∑
i∈N
ui,r(s)
≥ α−1 ·
∑
r∈R
∑
i∈N
ui,r(s−i, opti) (6.2)
= α−1 ·
∑
r∈R
∑
i∈N
min
(
opti(r),
br · opti(r)
opti(r) +
∑
i′ 6=i si′(r)
)
(6.3)
≥ α−1 ·
∑
r∈R
∑
i∈N
min
opti(r), br −∑
i′ 6=i
ui′,r(s)
 (6.4)
≥ α−1 ·
∑
r∈R
∑
i∈N
min
(
opti(r), br −
∑
i′∈N
ui′,r(s)
)
≥ α−1 ·
∑
r∈R
∑
i∈N
min
(
ui,r(opt), br −
∑
i′∈N
ui′,r(s)
)
≥ α−1 ·
∑
r∈R1
∑
i∈N
min
(
ui,r(opt), br −
∑
i′∈N
ui′,r(s)
)
+ α−1 ·
∑
r∈R2
∑
i∈N
ui,r(opt)
≥ α−1 ·
∑
r∈R1
(
br −
∑
i′∈N
ui′,r(s)
)
+ α−1 ·
∑
r∈R2
∑
i∈N
ui,r(opt)
≥ α−1 ·
∑
r∈R1
(∑
i∈N
ui,r(opt)−
∑
i∈N
ui,r(s)
)
+ α−1 ·
∑
r∈R2
∑
i∈N
ui,r(opt)
≥ α−1 ·
∑
r∈R
∑
i∈N
ui,r(opt)− α−1 ·
∑
r∈R1
∑
i∈N
ui,r(s)
≥ α−1 ·
∑
i∈N
ui(opt)− α−1 ·
∑
r∈R
∑
i∈N
ui,r(s)
≥ α−1
∑
i∈N
ui(opt)− α−1
∑
i∈N
ui(s)
Equation 2: Bounding the social welfare of an α-approximate Nash equilibrium in
budget games, which is smaller than the social welfare of the optimal solution by a
factor of at most α+ 1.
60
Efficiency of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria 6.2
sN
2
s1
δ
sn1
sn1+1
2
α n2
δ N
sn1+1
1
sn1+2
1
sn1+3
1
sN
1
α/ N
α/ N
α/ N
α/ N
δ
δ
δ
1
Figure 6.5: While the players n1+1, . . . , N can choose between the left and the right
resource, the other players 1, . . . , n1 have to use the right resource, as
this is their only strategy.
in our regular setting. From here on, the proof follows the same path as it did for
ordered budget games.
Our result holds for all approximate Nash equilibria. Even if we set α < αuδ , a
δ-share budget game may still have an α-approximate Nash equilibria and its price
of anarchy is at most α + 1. Again, this upper bound is almost tight in the sense
that there are instances where the actual price of anarchy of a δ-share budget game
can come arbitrary close to it.
Theorem 6.8. For all ε > 0, there is a budget game Bε with PoAα(Bε) = α+1−ε.
Proof. A lower bound of α is trivial for any kind of game and any value of α. To
see that we can come arbitrarily close to α + 1, we consider the budget game Bε.
Let both δ and α be arbitrary, but fixed. Choose n1 ∈ N such that δn1 ≥ 1 and
n2 ∈ N. Let N := n1 + n2. Then Bε is defined as
• N1 = {1, . . . , N}
• R1 = {r1, r2}
• br1 = αn2δN and br2 = 1
• Si = {si = (0, δ)} for i ∈ {1, . . . , n1}
Si = {s1i = ( αN , 0) , s2i = (0, δ)} for i ∈ {n1 + 1, . . . , N}
The resulting game is a δ-share budget game and shown in Figure 6.5. The players
1, . . . , n1 have only one strategy to choose from. Consider the strategy profile
s = (s1, . . . , sn1 , s
2
n1+1
, . . . , s2N ). The utility of the players i = n1 + 1, . . . , N is
1
N
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each. Strategy s1i yields a fixed utility of
α
N , so while s is an α-approximate Nash
equilibrium with u(s) = 1, opt = (s1, . . . , sn1 , s
1
n1+1
, . . . , s1N ) has a social welfare of
1 + n2 · αN . For n2 large enough, this comes close to α+ 1.
6.3 Complexity of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria
We are now going to address the complexity of approximate Nash equilibria in
budget games. A δ-share budget game can still have an α-approximate Nash equi-
librium for α < αlδ. However, determining this is NP-hard.
Theorem 6.9. Let δ > 0 and α < αlδ. To decide if a δ-share budget game B has
an α-approximate Nash equilibrium is NP-complete.
Proof. The problem obviously lies in NP, as the verification of a given strategy
profile can be done in polynomial time. To show that it is also NP-hard, we reduce
from the exact cover by 3-sets problem, which is also NP-complete. An instance
of exact cover by 3-sets problem has the form I = (U ,W), consisting of a set U
with |U| = 3m for m ∈ N and a collection of subsets W = {W1, . . . ,Wq} ⊆ U with
|Wk| = 3 for every k. Computing an exact cover of U in which every element is in
exactly one subset from W is NP-hard [32]. For δ > 0, we choose an instance I
with q −m ≥ 1δ .
From I, we create a budget game B by combining two smaller games B0 and BI .
B0 is the budget game introduced in Definition 4.1. We label its two main players
as player 1 and 2. For convenience, we define u′ := δδ+γ+σ + γ. BI is constructed
from I as follows.
• NB0 = {3, . . . , q + 2}
• RB0 = U ∪ {r′}
• br = 1 for all r ∈ R \ {r′}
br′ = 3(q −m)αδ + u′α
• Si = {s1i , s2i } for i = 3, . . . , q + 2
The demands are defined as
s1i (rj) :=
 δ if j ∈ Wi−20 else and s2i (r′) = 3αδ.
All other demands are 0.
For the rest of this proof, we assume that 2δ > br = 1. If this is not the case,
we refer to Definition 4.1 and add auxiliary players with singular strategy spaces
to reduce the available capacity of the resources.
We combine the two unrelated games BI and B0 by creating the union of the
corresponding sets and introducing one additional strategy s32 for the second player
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1 s2
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1s1
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1
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γ
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γ
δ
δ
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1
1
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δ br 'si
2 3α δ
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u' / α
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δ
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Figure 6.6: The budget game B, created from the budget games B0 and BI . As
long as player 2 chooses strategy s12 or s
2
2, B0 has no α-approximate
Nash equilibrium for α < αlδ (cf. Theorem 6.6). So in order for such
an equilibrium to exist, player 2 has to choose strategy s32. This only
happens if at most (q−m) many players i from BI do not choose strategy
s2i . These players then form an exact cover over the remaining resources
in BI .
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from B0. This strategy uses only the resource r′ with s32(r′) = u
′
α and s
3
2(r) = 0 for
all r ∈ R \ {r′}. For the final result, see Figure 6.6.
B is indeed a δ-share BAG. For the resource r′, note that both
3(q −m)αδ + u
′
α
≥ 3(q −m)αδ ≥ 3α
δ
δ = 3α
and
(q −m)3αδ + u
′
α
≥ 3α+ u
′
α
≥ 3
α
+
u′
α
≥ 2δ(1− δ)
αδ
+
u′
α
≥ u
′(1− δ)
αδ
+
u′
α
=
u′
αδ
,
so no demand on r′ exceeds δbr′ .
We already know that B0 has no α-approximate Nash equilibrium for α < αlδ.
Since the second player now has an additional strategy s32, there cannot be any α-
approximate Nash equilibrium s = (s1, s2, . . . , sq+2) of B in which this player plays
a different strategy. However, if u2,r′(s) < s2(r
′), the second player will always
choose either s12 or s
2
2. Therefore, at most (q −m) players i ∈ {3, . . . , q + 2} from
BI are allowed to play s2i . Every player i with strategy s1i and utility below 3δ will
switch to s2i . Therefore, exactly m players pick s
1
i in s and they form an exact cover
over the resources r1, . . . , r3m.
This result is particularly interesting as it also holds for α = 1.
Corollary 6.10. To decide if a budget game B has a Nash equilibrium is NP-
complete.
6.4 Properties of the Best-Response Dynamic
In Section 6.1, we have seen that budget games possess the finite improvement
property regarding α-approximate Nash equilibria for α ≥ αuδ . Now, we are going
to show that the best-response dynamic also converges quickly towards approximate
Nash equilibria if we choose α even larger than αuδ and if the utilities of the most-
profitable strategies of the players do not differ too much from each other. One
example of games with the second property are symmetric games, in which all
players share a common strategy space and the best strategy of one player is also
the best of all others. In this context, best refers to the corresponding utility if
the player does not share any budget with another player. The following definition
formalizes this notion.
Definition 6.11. Let B be a budget game. For player i ∈ N , we define sopti ∈ Si
to be the strategy of i with∑
r∈R
min(sopti (r), br) ≥
∑
r∈R
min(si(r), br)
for all si ∈ Si. The corresponding utility is denoted by
uopti :=
∑
r∈R
min(sopti (r), br).
64
Properties of the Best-Response Dynamic 6.4
Although it is not guaranteed that sopti is actually part of an approximate Nash
equilibrium, we are going to use its utility uopti to give a general bound on the
utility of i for any strategy profile. We need two lemmata in order to pave the way
for the main convergence result of this section. The first one states that we can
expect that the various demands of a single player do not deviate too much from
each other.
Lemma 6.12. Let B be a δ-share budget game and s a strategy profile of B. For
all players i ∈ N it holds that
ui(s) ≥ u
opt
i
(nδ)2
.
Proof. First, we show that
ui,r(s−i, s
opt
i ) ≥
sopti (r)
nδ
holds for all resources r and strategy profiles s−i excluding player i. If Tr(s−i, s
opt
i ) ≤
br, then this is obviously true, as
ui,r(s−i, s
opt
i ) = s
opt
i (r) ≥
sopti (r)
nδ
for nδ > 1 (for nδ ≤ 1, see Lemma 6.1). If Tr(s−i, sopti ) > br, then
ui,r(s−i, s
opt
i ) =
sopti (r) · br
sopti + Tr(s−i)
≥ s
opt
i (r) · br
nδbr
=
sopti (r)
nδ
.
By summing up over all resources, we get
ui(s−i, s
opt
i ) ≥
∑
r∈R
sopti (r)
nδ
≥ u
opt
i
nδ
.
So we assume without loss of generality that for every strategy si ∈ Si we get∑
r∈R
min(si(r), br) ≥ u
opt
i
nδ
(6.5)
and ultimately
∑
r∈R
si(r) ≥ u
opt
i
nδ
. (6.6)
Otherwise, the strategy sopti would yield a higher utility in every strategy profile
and si would never the part of any Nash equilibrium.
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With this bound on the demands of a strategy, we can derive a lower bound on
its utility in the same manner. For Tr(s) ≤ br, we get
ui,r(s) = si(r) >
si(r)
nδ
for nδ > 1.
For Tr(s) > br, we get
ui,r(s) =
si(r) · br
Tr(s)
≥ si(r) · br
nδbr
=
si(r)
nδ
and in both cases, the result is
ui(s) =
∑
r∈R
ui,r(s) ≥
∑
r∈R
si(r)
nδ
≥ u
opt
i
(nδ)2
.
This proof is based on the assumption that the players are only considering those
strategies which are not too bad compared to their individual optimal strategy sopti .
This somewhat contradicts our assumption of a best-response dynamic based on α-
moves, as a player would be satisfied with any strategy if we just set α large enough.
With this approach, we are mainly concerned with whether a strategy could actually
be part of an exact Nash equilibrium. Given a game with corresponding strategy
spaces, determining a suitable α ≥ 1 for an α-approximate Nash equilibrium is
done afterwards.
The second lemma is more technical and bounds the potential of a strategy profile
with respect to its social welfare.
Lemma 6.13. For any δ-share budget game and any strategy profile s, we get
(1 + log(nδ)) · u(s) ≥ φ(s).
Proof. Consider a resource r and let ur(s) be the total utility obtained from r by
all players, i.e. ur(s) :=
∑
i∈N ui,r(s). We first show that (1 + log(nδ)) · ur(s) ≥
φr(s). Assume that Tr(s) ≥ br, otherwise φr(s) = ur(s) by the definition of φr. So
ur(s) = br, while
φr(s) = br +
∫ Tr(s)
br
br
x
dx = br
(
1 +
∫ Tr(s)
br
1
x
dx
)
.
This yields
φr(s)
ur(s)
= 1 +
∫ Tr(s)
br
1
x
dx = 1 + ln(Tr(s))− ln(br)
≤ 1 + ln(nδbr)− ln(br) = 1 + ln(nδ).
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By summing up over the resources, we get
φ(s)
u(s)
=
∑
r∈R φr(s)∑
r∈R ur(s)
≤ (1 + ln(nδ)) ·
∑
r∈R ur(s)∑
r∈R ur(s)
= 1 + ln(nδ).
With these two lemmata, we are able to bound the convergence speed of the best-
response dynamic using α-moves. We assume that α ≥ αuδ , otherwise we do not
know if there even is an α-approximate Nash equilibrium. Our result states that
the convergence speed depends on two factors: the difference between the upper
bound αuδ and the value of α actually used as well as the ratios between the highest
demands of the different players.
Theorem 6.14. Let δ ≤ 1, ε > 0 and λ ∈ ]0, 1]. Let B be a δ-share budget game
with the property that for all players i, j ∈ N , we get uopti ≥ λuoptj .
Then the number of (αuδ +ε)-moves until B reaches an (αuδ +ε)-approximate Nash
equilibrium is
O (log(n) · n5 · (ελ)−1) .
Given two strategies uopti and u
opt
j , we either get u
opt
i ≥ uoptj or uopti < uoptj . For
the second case, the scaling factor λ is used to achieve uopti ≥ λuoptj .
Proof. Let i be the player performing an (αuδ + ε)-move under the strategy profile
s, leading to the strategy profile s′. We can bound the increase in the potential.
Φ(s′)− Φ(s) ≥ε · ui(s)
(1)
≥ ε
(nδ)2
· uopti
(2)
≥ ε · λ
n(nδ)2
· u(s)
(3)
≥ ε · λ
n(1 + log(n))(nδ)2
· Φ(s)
Inequalities (1) and (3) follow by Lemma 6.12 and 6.13 respectively while (2) holds
due to
u(s) =
∑
j∈N
uj(s) ≤
∑
j∈N
uoptj ≤
n
λ
uopti .
For convenience, we define
β :=
ε · λ
n(1 + log(n))(nδ)2
.
Assuming it takes t steps to double the potential the game, then
Φ(s) = 2Φ(s)− Φ(s) ≥ β · t · Φ(s)⇔ t ≤ β−1.
So in order to double the current potential of B, we need at most β−1 improving
moves. Therefore, the game has to reach a corresponding equilibrium after at most
log
(
Φmax
Φmin
)
·β−1 improving moves, with Φmax and Φmin denoting the maximum and
minimum potential of B, respectively. Since Φmax ≤
∑
i∈N u
opt
i due to δ ≤ 1 and
Φmin ≥
∑
i∈N
uopti
(nδ)2
, we can bound log
(
Φmax
Φmin
)
≤ (nδ)2.
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6.5 Approximate Optimal Solution in General Budget
Games
To conclude this chapter, we use the approximate potential function φ to show that
the optimal solution of a budget game can be approximated by the best-response
dynamic. We have already seen that finding the optimal solution is NP-hard (cf.
Theorem 4.4) and we have given an approximation algorithm with an approximation
factor of 1− 1e (cf. Algorithm 1). However, that algorithm only works for matroid
budget games. The method we are going to introduce now, although only yielding
an approximation factor polylogarithmic in n, works for every budget game.
Our approach is based on concepts and results found in [6]. First, we show that a
certain class of utility-maximization games converge quickly towards socially good
states, i.e. strategy profiles with a social welfare close to the optimal solution, if
the players keep performing α-moves for a suitable α. We then apply this result to
budget games. For the following analysis, we require the notion of nice games [6].
Definition 6.15. Let λ, µ > 0. A utility-maximization game is (λ, µ)-nice if for
every strategy profile s, there is a strategy profile s′ with∑
i∈N
ui(s−i, s′i) ≥ λ · u(opt)− µ · u(s).
From now on, when talking about the best-response dynamic, we always assume
that the players only perform α-moves for α ≥ 1. If the current strategy si of player
i is not his best-response sbi to the current strategy profile s, he only changes his
strategy if ui(s−i, sbi) > α · ui(s). The actual value of α will be given later.
Theorem 6.16. Let B be a (λ, µ)-nice utility-maximization game with a potential
function φ(s) such that for some A,B,C ≥ 1, we have that
A · φ(s) ≥ u(s) ≥ 1
B
· φ(s)
and
φ(s−i, sbi)− φ(s) ≥ ui(s−i, sbi)− C · ui(s).
Let ρ = λC+µ . Then, for any ε > 0 and any initial strategy profile s
0, the best-
response dynamic reaches a state st with
u(st) ≥ ρ(1− ε)
AB
· u(opt) in at most O
(
n
A(C + µ)
log
1
ε
)
steps.
All future states reached by this best-response dynamic will satisfy this approxima-
tion factor as well.
Proof. We adapt a modification of a proof from [6], with the difference that our
version does not require an exact potential function, but also works with approx-
imate potential functions like the one from Definition 6.2. For the best-response
68
Approximate Optimal Solution in General Budget Games 6.5
dynamic, we assume a specific order in which the players perform their strategy
changes. For any strategy profile s, the next player i who changes his strategy is
chosen such that he maximizes the term ui(s−i, sbi)− C · ui(s), i.e.
ui(s−i, sbi)− C · ui(s) = max
j∈N
{
uj(s−j , sbj)− C · uj(s)
}
.
We then obtain
φ(s−i, sbi)− φ(s) ≥ ui(s−i, sbi)− C · ui(s)
≥ 1|N ′|
(∑
i∈N ′
ui(s
b
i , s−i)− α · ui(s)
)
=
1
|N ′|
∑
i∈N
ui(s
b
i , s−i)−
∑
i∈N ′
α · ui(s)−
∑
i∈N\N ′
ui(s)

≥ 1
n
∑
j∈N
uj(s−j , sbj)− C · uj(s)

(1)
≥ 1
n
(λ · u(opt)− (C + µ)u(s))
≥ 1
n
(λ · u(opt)−A(C + µ)φ(s)) =: f(s).
(1) uses the fact that B is (λ, µ)-nice. With this definition of f(s), we see that
f(s)− f(s−i, sbi) =
A(C + µ)
n
(
φ(s−i, sbi)− φ(s)
)
≥ A(C + µ)
n
f(s)
and therefore f(s−i, sbi) ≤
(
1− A(C+µ)n
)
f(s). So if s0 is the initial strategy profile,
then the best response dynamic converges towards a strategy profile st with
f(st) ≤
(
1− A(C + µ)
n
)t
f(s0).
By setting t =
⌈
n
A(C+µ) log
1
ε
⌉
and using that
(
1− 1x
)x ≤ 1e , we obtain
f(st) ≤ e(log 1/ε)−1 · f(s0) = ε · f(s0) ≤ ε · λ · u(opt)
n
.
Using these results and the bounds for the potential function, we obtain
u(st) ≥ 1
B
· φ(st) = n
AB(C + µ)
·
(
λ · u(opt)
n
− f(st)
)
≥ n
AB(C + µ)
·
(
(1− ε)λ · u(opt)
n
)
≥ ρ(1− ε)
AB
· u(opt).
69
Chapter 6 APPROXIMATE PURE NASH EQUILIBRIA IN BUDGET GAMES
We also see that φ(st) ≥ ρ(1−ε)A · u(opt). Since φ grows with every strategy change,
this bound also holds for all following strategy profiles.
When adapting this result for budget games, note that the players have to perform
α-moves for α ≥ αuδ when following the best-response dynamic. Otherwise, there
is no guarantee that the approximate potential function φ from Definition 6.2 is
strictly monotone.
Corollary 6.17. Let B be a δ-share budget game and α ≥ αuδ . For any ε > 0
and any initial strategy profile s0, the best-response dynamic using only α-moves
reaches a state st with
u(st) ≥ 1− ε
(α2 + 1)(ln(nδ) + 1)
u(opt)
in at most
O
(
n
α+ α−1
log
1
ε
)
steps. All future states reached by this best-response dynamic will satisfy this
approximation factor as well.
Proof. First we show that any δ-share budget game is (α−1, α−1)-nice. Let s be an
arbitrary strategy profile. We show that
∑
i∈N ui(s−i, s
b
i) ≥ α−1 ·u(opt)−α−1 ·u(s).
Note that ui(s−i, sbi) ≥ ui(s−i, opti) by definition of sbi . This implies ui(s−i, sbi) ≥
α−1 · ui(s−i, opti) and we can therefore copy the proof of Theorem 6.7 to show that∑
i∈N ui(s−i, s
b
i) ≥ α−1 · u(opt)− α−1 · u(s).
We now use the approximate potential function φ(s) from Definition 6.2, for
which we know that
φ(s) ≥ u(s) ≥ 1
1 + ln(nδ)
φ(s) (cf. Lemma 6.13)
and
φ(s−i, sbi)− φ(s) ≥ ui(s−i, sbi)− α · ui(s) (cf. proof of Theorem 6.4).
So we get A = 1, B = 1 + ln(nδ) and C = α. Using these values together with
Theorem 6.16 directly proofs the statement.
As already stated, this result is valid for all budget games, not just matroid ones.
However, it does not say anything about how quickly a utility-maximization game
reaches an (approximate) equilibrium if following the best-response dynamic. So
while this may take an exponential number of steps, the social welfare approaches
its optimum relatively fast.
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Nash Equilibria in Budget Games under
Restrictions
In the last chapter of this thesis, we approach the non-existence of Nash equilibria
in budget games from a different angle. Instead of changing the model or resorting
to approximate Nash equilibria, we consider restrictions on budget games which
restore equilibria. First, we look at games in which the demand of each player is
fixed, i.e. the demand of player i is di on every resource in every strategy. For both
singleton and matroid budget games, this yields the finite improvement property.
We then see that singleton budget games with only two resources are weakly acyclic.
By using a similar proof technique, we also show that Nash equilibria still exist
for singleton budget games with m > 2 resources and additional restrictions on
the demands. Singleton budget games are also weakly acyclic if the number of
demands is restricted to two, i.e. the demand of any strategy on any resource is
either d+ or d−, with both values shared by all players and if all budgets are the
same. The chapter is concluded with one last result regarding approximate Nash
equilibria, this time specifically for matroid budget games. Independent of the size
of the demands (the value of δ in a δ-restricted budget games), good approximate
equilibria can be obtained by the best-response dynamic if the deviations between
the different demands of each individual player are small.
Before we continue with the introduction of this section, we introduce a small
technical lemma, which is used in most of the proofs found in this chapter. It states
that in a budget game, a player with a larger demand always receives a higher utility
from a resource than a player with a smaller demand.
Lemma 7.1. Let d1, d2 ∈ R>0 with d1 ≤ d2 and br, Tr(s) ∈ R≥0 with Tr(s)+d1 ≥ br.
Then
d1 ·min
(
1,
br
Tr(s) + d1
)
≤ d2 ·min
(
1,
br
Tr(s) + d2
)
.
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Proof. Proof by case distinction. Due to d1 ≤ d2, we only need to consider three
cases.
• for min
(
1, brTr(s)+d1
)
= min
(
1, brTr(s)+d2
)
= 1, the statement becomes trivial.
• for min
(
1, brTr(s)+d1
)
= 1 and min
(
1, brTr(s)+d2
)
= brTr(s)+d2 ,
we get d1 ≤ br−Tr(s) while br−Tr(s)d2 ≤
br−Tr(s)+Tr(s)
d2+Tr(s)
= brd2+Tr(s) , which can be
transformed to br − Tr(s) < d2 · brd2+Tr(s) .
• for min
(
1, brTr(s)+d1
)
= brTr(s)+d1 and min
(
1, brTr(s)+d2
)
= brTr(s)+d2 ,
we get d1d2 ≤
d1+Tr(s)
d2+Tr(s)
(since d1d2 ≤ 1) and therefore d1Tr(s)+d1 ≤
d2
Tr(s)+d2
.
Large parts of this chapter focus primarily on singleton budget games. In these,
every strategy uses exactly one resource, i.e. the demand of the strategy on every
resource except one is 0. If we look back to their formal definition (cf. Defini-
tion 2.19), we do not allow the same player to have multiple strategies imposing
different demands on the same resource. With Lemma 7.1, we see now that a higher
demand always yields a higher utility. If two or more strategies by the same player
i would use a common resource r (and just that resource), then only the strategy
with the highest demand on r can be part of a Nash equilibrium. If i chooses a
different strategy using r, then he is always able to increase his own utility through
a unilateral strategy change. So the property of having only one demand for each
player-resource combination does not really restrict the model of singleton budget
games with respect to Nash equilibria.
For matroid budget games, the situation is somewhat different. In the field of
congestion games, the matroid property states that every strategy change consists
of lazy moves (cf. Definition 2.21), which basically means that every strategy change
switches a variable number of old resources for the same number of new ones. One
can regard this as a sequence of atomic strategy changes in which only one resource
is switched for another and every intermediate step yields a valid strategy for the
corresponding player. As a result, every atomic strategy change already increases
his utility. Since the weights of the players in a congestion game are usually fixed,
this suffices to ensure that the effects of a strategy change only affect a small
part of the game, with the congestion of only one resource in- and of another one
decreasing. For matroid budget games, we have to be careful that a strategy change
which swaps one resource for another does not also change any other demands at
the same time. This would no longer fit the intuition behind the lazy moves of
a matroid congestion game and a lazy strategy change of a single player could
affect every resource in the game. To prevent this from happening, we require each
player to a fixed demand for each resource. This is modeled by the first bullet
point in Definition 2.21. For congestion games, the matroid property represents an
extension of the singleton property. To maintain this for budget games, we also
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expect a fixed demand for each player-resource combination for singleton budget
games. As discussed above, this does not actually restrict the model regarding our
concerns.
From now on, we simplify the notation for strategies. Instead of si = (0, . . . , 0,
si(r), 0, . . . , 0), we simply write si = {r} and denote the corresponding demand by
di(r) = si(r).
7.1 Matroid Budget Games with Fixed Player Demands
The first class of budget games we analyze are those with fixed player demands. In
these, every player has a single demand which he imposes on every resource in his
strategy. In addition, this value does not change with the strategy.
Definition 7.2 (Budget Games with Fixed Player Demands). Let B be a budget
game. If for every i ∈ N there is a di ∈ R>0 such that for every r ∈ R and every
s ∈ Si it holds that s(r) = di, then B is a budget game with fixed player demands.
For budget games with fixed player demands, we get
ui(s) = di ·
∑
r∈si
min
(
1,
br
Tr(s)
)
.
We show that such games have the finite improvement property, provided they are
also matroid games. To do this, we need a potential function.
Definition 7.3 (Lexicographical Potential Function). For a budget game B with
resource r and strategy profile s, let
cr(s) := min
(
1,
br
Tr(s)
)
.
The function φ : S → Rm>0 with φ(s) = (cr1(s), . . . , crm(s)) such that the entries of
φ(s) are sorted in ascending order is a lexicographical potential function of B.
Using φ, we can prove the following theorem.
Theorem 7.4. A matroid budget game with fixed player demands reaches a Nash
equilibrium after a finite number of improving moves.
Proof. In a matroid game, we can regard every strategy change as a sequence of lazy
strategy changes. In a lazy strategy change, exactly one resource is switched for an-
other. Every lazy strategy change already increases the utility of the corresponding
player. In this proof, we show that it increases φ, as well.
Let player i perform a lazy strategy change in strategy profile s, during which he
replaces resource r for r′. Let s′ be the resulting strategy profile.
ui,r(s) = di ·min
(
1,
br
Tr(s)
)
< di ·min
(
1,
br′
Tr′(s) + di
)
= ui,r′(s
′)
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or simply
cr(s) = min
(
1,
br
Tr(s)
)
< min
(
1,
br
Tr(s’)
)
= cr′(s
′).
Since cr(s) < cr(s
′) and cr(s) < cr′(s′), we get φ(s) ≤lex φ(s′), so φ is strictly
increasing regarding the lexicographical order when the only strategy changes are
improving moves.
One might argue that this result is based mainly on the fact that the demands
are fixed and not on the structure of the strategy spaces. To see that this is not
the case, consider the budget game B1.
Definition 7.5. Let d1 = daux = 1000 and d2 = 1. We define the budget game B1
as follows:
• N1 = {1, 2} ∪ {auxi | i = 1, . . . , 999}
• R1 = {r1, r2} ∪ {r1i | i = 1, . . . ,m} ∪ {r2i | i = 1, . . . ,m} for m = 1000
• br = 1000 for all r ∈ R
• S1 = { s11 = (d1, 0, d1, . . . , d1︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
) , s21 = (0, d1, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
, d1, . . . , d1︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
) }
S2 = { s12 = (0, d2, d2, . . . , d2︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
) , s22 = (d2, 0, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
, d2, . . . , d2︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
) }
Sauxi = { s = (0, 0, daux, . . . , daux︸ ︷︷ ︸
2m
) }
The game B1, which is sketched in Figure 7.1, is not a matroid budget game. The
players auxi for i = 1, . . . , 999 are auxiliary players. Just like in the budget game
B0 from Definition 4.1, they only exist so that there is a permanent demand on
some of the resources. Each auxiliary player has only one strategy, which imposes
a demand of 1000 on every resource except r1 and r2. Due to their existence, B1
is a δ-share budget game for δ = 1. Also similar to B0, one of the two players 1
or 2 is not in an equilibrium in every strategy profile, of which there are only four.
An overview of these strategy profiles and the corresponding utilities is given in
Table 7.1. Note that both 1000
3
10002+1
> 1000
2
1000+1 and 1 +
10002
10002+1
< 10001000+1 +
10002
1000·999+1 .
Therefore, player 1 prefers strategy si1 if and only if player 2 has chosen s
i
2. On the
other hand, player 2 prefers strategy si2 if and only if player 1 has chosen s
j
1 with
i 6= j.
Observation 7.6. There is a budget game B1 with fixed player demands, which is
not a matroid budget game and does not possess a Nash equilibrium.
For matroid budget games with fixed player demands, the best-response dynamic
always results in a Nash equilibrium after a finite number of steps. However, we
cannot say anything regarding the number of improving moves (polynomial vs.
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s1
1 1000 s2
1
s1
2 1000 s2
2
d 1
d 1
1000
1000
d 1
d 1
d 2
d 2
d 1
d 1
1000
1000
d 2
d 2
d 2
d 2
r1
r2
r1
1
r m
1
r1
2
r m
2
Figure 7.1: The budget game B1 with fixed demands and no Nash equilibrium. We
choose d1 = 1000 and d2 = 1. Note that the auxiliary players, who
use all resources expect r1 and r2, are not shown. The total number of
resources is 2m+ 1: m resources at the top, m resources at the bottom
and the two resources r1 and r2.
players strategy profiles
(s11, s
1
2) (s
1
1, s
2
2) (s
2
1, s
1
2) (s
2
1, s
2
2)
1 1000 + 1000
3
10002+1
10002
1000+1 + 1000
10002
1000+1 + 1000 1000 +
10003
10002+1
2 1 + 1000
2
10002+1
1000
1000+1 +
10002
1000·999+1
1000
1000+1 +
10002
1000·999+1 1 +
10002
10002+1
Table 7.1: Overview of the different strategy profiles and the corresponding utilities
of the budget game B1. Since the strategies of the auxiliary players are
fixed, we abuse notation and restrict the strategy profiles to the strategies
of the two players 1 and 2.
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exponential) and whether it is a feasible way of determining an equilibrium. We can
circumvent this by further restricting the class of games to singleton budget games
with fixed player demands. As every singleton game is also a matroid game, our
former result still holds. In addition, one can efficiently compute a Nash equilibrium
for these kinds of games by using a different approach. To show this, we first
introduce the following lemma. It states that if there are two players in a singleton
game with fixed demands on the same resource r and the player with the larger
demand wants to switch from r to r′, then the same holds for the player with the
smaller demand.
Lemma 7.7. Let d1, d2 ∈ R>0 with d1 ≤ d2 and br, br′ , Tr(s), Tr′(s) ∈ R≥0. If
d2 ·min
(
1,
br
Tr(s)
)
≤ d2 ·min
(
1,
br′
Tr′(s) + d2
)
then also
d1 ·min
(
1,
br
Tr(s)
)
≤ d1 ·min
(
1,
br′
Tr′(s) + d1
)
Proof. Proof by case distinction. We only need to consider two cases.
• for min
(
1, brTr(s)
)
< min
(
1,
br′
Tr′ (s)+d2
)
= 1, the statement becomes trivial.
• for min
(
1, brTr(s)+d1
)
= brTr(s) and min
(
1,
br′
Tr′ (s)+d2
)
=
br′
Tr′ (s)+d2
,
the statement d2 · brTr(s) ≤ d2 ·
br′
Tr′ (s)+d2
directly implies
d1 · brTr(s) ≤ d1 ·
br′
Tr′ (s)+d2
≤ d1 · br′Tr′ (s)+d1
Using this lemma, we see that a Nash equilibrium can be computed by inserting
the players one after another in descending order of their demands.
Theorem 7.8. Let B be a singleton budget game with fixed player demands. Start-
ing with an empty strategy profile and letting the players pick their best-response
one after another in descending order of their demands yields a Nash equilibrium
in O(n) steps.
Proof. We only need to show that a strategy choice made by player i does not
change the best-response of any player j who was inserted into the game at some
earlier point in time. Let s be the (partial) strategy profile the moment before i is
inserted into the game with sj = {r}. If i also chooses resource r, then this implies
di ·min
(
1,
br′
Tr′(s) + di
)
≤ di ·min
(
1,
br
Tr(s) + di
)
for all r′ ∈ R. By the contraposition of Lemma 7.7, this also holds for all players j
on r with di ≤ dj who were inserted earlier. This proves our statement.
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7.2 Singleton Budget Games with Two Resources
In this section, we show that any singleton budget game which consists of only two
different resources r1 and r2 is weakly acyclic. In such a game, every player i has
exactly two strategies, s1i = (s
1
i (r1), 0) and s
2
i = (0, s
2
i (r2)) with s
1
i (r1), s
2
i (r2) > 0.
This result can then be applied to matroid budget games, as well. We introduce a
new variant of budget games, which allow a fixed offset to the total demand on a
resource.
Definition 7.9. Let B be a strategic or ordered budget game for which we introduce
an offset σr ∈ R≥0 to every resource r ∈ R such that the utility of player i from r
under strategy profile s is defined as
ui,r(s) = min
(
si(r),
si(r) · br
Tr(s) + σr
)
= si(r) ·min
(
1,
br
Tr(s) + σr
)
.
We then call B an offset budget game.
It is easy to see that by setting σr = 0 for every r ∈ R, every offset budget game
becomes a regular budget game.
Theorem 7.10. Every singleton offset budget game with two resources is weakly
acyclic.
Proof. For the actual proof, we use an induction over the number of players. For a
game with n players, we denote the offset of resource r with σnr .
Induction start (n = 2): For any initial strategy profile and any offsets, it takes
at most three improving moves by the players to reach a Nash equilibrium.
After the first player has chosen his best-response, the second one either picks
the other resource, resulting in a Nash equilibrium, or the same as the first
player. In the latter case, the first player may change his strategy once more,
which only increases the utility of the second player.
Induction hypothesis: Every singleton offset budget game with two resources and
n− 1 players is weakly acyclic.
Induction step (n− 1→ n): Without loss of generality, we assume that s1n(r1) ≥
s2n(r2) and s
1
n(r1) ≥ s1i (r1) for all i = 1, . . . , n − 1. We fix the strategy of
player n to s1n. The resulting game is identical to an offset budget game
with n − 1 players and σn−1r1 = σnr1 + s1n(r1), σn−1r2 = σnr2 . By induction
hypothesis, this game is weakly acyclic and the remaining players can reach
a Nash equilibrium s1 after a finite number of improving moves. We assume
that un(s
1) < un(s
1−n, s2n), as otherwise s1 is still a Nash equilibrium even if
the strategy of player n is not fixed. By the same arguments, the game has
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a Nash equilibrium s2 if we fix the strategy of player n to s2n. This time, we
assume un(s
2) < un(s
2−n, s1n). We obtain the following two inequalities:
s1n(r1) ·min
(
1,
b1
Tr1(s
1) + σnr1
)
< s2n(r2) ·min
(
1,
b2
Tr2(s
1) + σnr2 + s
2
n(r2)
)
(7.1)
s2n(r2) ·min
(
1,
b2
Tr2(s
2) + σnr2
)
< s1n(r1) ·min
(
1,
b1
Tr1(s
2) + σnr1 + s
1
n(r1)
)
(7.2)
Combining them yields
min
(
1,
b1
Tr1(s
1) + σnr1
)
·min
(
1,
b2
Tr2(s
2) + σnr2
)
<min
(
1,
b2
Tr2(s
1) + σnr2 + s
2
n(r2)
)
·min
(
1,
b1
Tr1(s
2) + σnr1 + s
1
n(r1)
)
.
We now make a crucial observation. There has to be at least one player i who
chooses the same resource as player n in both s1 and s2. If player n is the
only player on resource r1 in s
1, then all other players are on r2. Equation 7.1
states that n is still willing to move over to r2, implying that resource r1 is
never a best-response. So there has to be at least one additional player i on
r1 in s
1. Let nr(s) be the set of all players located on resource r in strategy
profile s. If nr1(s
1)∩nr2(s2) = {n}, then nr2(s2)\{n} ⊆ nr2(s1), contradicting
that n is satisfied with r2 in (s
1−n, s2n) but not in s2. So at least one player i
shares the same resource as n in both s1 and s2.
By definition, player i cannot improve his utility in neither s1 nor s2, so
s1i (r1) ·min
(
1,
b1
Tr1(s
1) + σnr1
)
≥ s2i (r2) ·min
(
1,
b2
Tr2(s
1) + σnr2 + s
2
i (r2)
)
⇒min
(
1,
b1
Tr1(s
1) + σnr1
)
≥ s
2
i (r2)
s1i (r1)
·min
(
1,
b2
Tr2(s
1) + σnr2 + s
2
i (r2)
)
(7.3)
and
s2i (r2) ·min
(
1,
b2
Tr2(s
2) + σnr2
)
≥ s1i (r1) ·min
(
1,
b1
Tr1(s
2) + σnr1 + s
1
i (r1)
)
⇒min
(
1,
b2
Tr2(s
2) + σnr2
)
≥ s
1
i (r1)
s2i (r2)
·min
(
1,
b2
Tr1(s
2) + σnr1 + s
1
i (r1)
)
. (7.4)
At the beginning of the induction step, we assumed that s1n(r1) ≥ s1i (r1). We
now show that s2n(r2) ≥ s2i (r2) has to hold as well. Suppose that s2i (r2) >
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s2n(r2). According to Lemma 7.1 and Equation 7.3, this would imply that
s1 is also an equilibrium for player n, contradicting our initial assumption.
Therefore, s2n(r2) ≥ s2i (r2) has to hold. Using the inequalities regarding player
i and n, we obtain
min
(
1,
b2
Tr2(s
1) + σnr2 + s
2
i (r2)
)
·min
(
1,
b2
Tr1(s
2) + σnr1 + s
1
i (r1)
)
<min
(
1,
b2
Tr2(s
1) + σnr2 + s
2
n(r2)
)
·min
(
1,
b2
Tr1(s
2) + σnr1 + s
1
n(r1)
)
.
This is a contradiction, since the demand of player n is larger than that of
player i on both resources. Our proof shows that any attempt to construct a
cycle of strategy profiles results in a contradiction at some point.
Since every budget game is also an offset budget game, we can immediately draw
the following conclusion.
Corollary 7.11. Every singleton budget game with two resources is weakly acyclic.
The proof of Theorem 7.10 also yields a trivial recursive algorithm for computing
a Nash equilibrium. For the first n−1 players, one can compute two Nash equilibria,
one for each strategy choice by player n. One of these two states also has to be a
Nash equilibrium for all players. We can fix the strategies of an arbitrary number
of players, as the offsets of the resources only depend on the total demand, not on
the players responsible. However, this approach requires an exponential number of
computational steps.
Our result not only holds for singleton, but for matroid budget games, as well.
Let i be a player in a matroid budget game with two resources, whose strategy
space does not consist of singleton strategies. By definition, he then possesses only
one strategy using both resources and his existence only introduces a fixed offset to
both resources. This holds for all players with non-singleton strategy spaces. The
Nash equilibrium of the remaining players who do possess only singleton strategies
can be determined as shown above.
Corollary 7.12. Every matroid (offset) budget game with two resources is weakly
acyclic.
7.3 Singleton Budget Games with Ordered Players and
Increasing Demand Ratios
We now extend the technique used in the previous section to singleton games with
more than two resources. However, we need two additional restrictions: a total
order on the players (based on their demands) and increasing demand ratios. The
first restriction states that although the demands of the players are no longer fixed,
their order is the same for every resource.
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Definition 7.13 (Ordered Players). Let B be a singleton budget game such that
for all i, j ∈ N and all r, r′ ∈ R it holds that
di(r) ≤ dj(r)⇒ di(r′) ≤ dj(r′).
Then B is a budget game with ordered players.
In addition, we require the ratios between the demands of a single player to
increase with increasing demands.
Definition 7.14 (Increasing Demand Ratios). Let B be a singleton budget game
with ordered players and i, j ∈ N such that di(r) ≤ dj(r) for all r ∈ R. If for all
r, r′ ∈ R with di(r) ≤ di(r′) it holds that
di(r
′)
di(r)
≤ dj(r
′)
dj(r)
,
then B has increasing demand ratios.
Singleton budget games with increasing demand ratios have similar properties
than general singleton budget games with only two resources, which is why Nash
equilibria always exist.
Theorem 7.15. Singleton offset budget games with ordered players and increasing
demand ratios always have a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Proof by induction over the number of players. For a game with n players,
we denote the offset of resource r with σnr .
Induction start (n = 2): The induction start is identical to the proof of Theo-
rem 7.10, so we refer to that.
Induction hypothesis: Every singleton offset budget game with n−1 ordered play-
ers and increasing demand ratios has a Nash equilibrium.
Induction step (n− 1→ n): Without loss of generality, we assume that s1n(r1) ≥
s2n(r) for all r ∈ R and also that s1n(r1) ≥ s1i (r1) for all i ∈ N . We fix the
strategy of player n to s1n. The resulting game is identical to an offset budget
game with n− 1 ordered players and σn−1r1 = σnr1 + s1n(r1) and σn−1r = σnr for
all r ∈ R \ {r1}. By induction hypothesis, this game has a Nash equilibrium
s (with sn = {r1}). Now assume that s is not an equilibrium for n. Then we
get
un(s) = sn(r1) ·min
(
1,
b1
Tr1(s) + σ
n
r1
)
< sn(r2) ·min
(
1,
b2
Tr2(s) + σ
n
r2 + sn(r2)
)
= un(s−n, r2)
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for some r2 ∈ R. Let i be another player on r1, i.e. si = {r1}. Since r1 is the
best-response of i, the following has to hold.
ui(s) = si(r1) ·min
(
1,
b1
Tr1(s) + σ
n
r1
)
≥ si(r2) ·min
(
1,
b2
Tr2(s) + σ
n
r2 + si(r2)
)
= ui(s−i, r2)
By combining these two inequalities, we get
si(r2)
si(r1)
·min
(
1,
b2
Tr2(s) + σ
n
r2 + si(r2)
)
<
sn(r2)
sn(r1)
·min
(
1,
b2
Tr2(s) + σ
n
r2 + sn(r2)
)
,
which can be transformed to
min
(
1,
b2
Tr2(s) + σ
n
r2 + si(r2)
)
·
(
min
(
1,
b2
Tr2(s) + σ
n
r2 + sn(r2)
))−1
<
sn(r2)
sn(r1)
· si(r1)
si(r2)
.
Since si(r2) ≤ sn(r2), this can be simplified to
1 <
sn(r2)
sn(r1)
· si(r1)
si(r2)
⇒ si(r1)
si(r2)
>
sn(r1)
sn(r2)
.
This contradicts our restriction that the demand ratios are increasing and
implies that i cannot exist. So n is the only player on resource r1 and since
this is his preferred resource, it is also his best-response. We conclude that s
is a Nash equilibrium for all n players.
Again, this result holds for regular budget games, in particular.
Corollary 7.16. Singleton budget games with ordered players and increasing de-
mand ratios always have a Nash equilibrium.
7.4 Singleton Budget Games with Two Demands and
Unified Budgets
In this section, we consider singleton budget games with only two different demands.
In other words, there are two constants d− and d+ and the demand of any player
on any resource equals one of them. In addition, we assume all resources to be
identical, with their budgets being all the same. The resulting class of games is
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called budget games with two demands and unified budgets. For this section, we
assume that every resource is available to every player. In other words, for every
player i and every resource r, there is a strategy si ∈ Si using r. Otherwise, our
result does not hold.
Definition 7.17 (Budget Games with Two Demands). Let d−, d+ ∈ R>0 and B be
a budget game such that for every player i, every strategy si ∈ Si and every resource
r, we get si(r) ∈ {d−, d+}. Then we call B a budget game with two demands.
Definition 7.18 (Budget Games with Unified Budgets). Let B be a budget game
such that for all r, r′ ∈ R it holds that br = br′ . Then we call B a budget game with
unified budgets.
Without loss of generality, we assume d− ≤ d+. In this section, we only con-
sider singleton budget games with two demands and unified budgets, so each player
uses exactly one resource in every strategy profile. We introduce Algorithm 2,
which computes Nash equilibria for this class of games. The algorithm utilizes the
best-response dynamic and only controls the order in which the improving moves
are executed. Therefore, the correctness of the algorithm also proves that these
games are weakly acyclic. We begin by introducing a number of technical lemmata.
Afterwards, we extend the definition of the lexicographical potential function (cf.
Definition 7.3) to obtain an augmented lexicographical potential function φ. Dur-
ing the execution of Algorithm 2, this new kind of potential function is strictly
increasing for at least every second strategy change. In other words, if s1, s2 and s3
are successive strategy profiles during the execution of the algorithm, then either
φ(s1) < φ(s2) or φ(s1) ≥ φ(s2) but φ(s1) < φ(s3). When discussing the second case,
we combine the two strategy changes between s1, s2 and s2, s3 into a single macro
strategy change, which transforms s1 directly into s3.
By assigning a type to every strategy change, depending on the player’s demand
before and after, we are able to formally analyze its effects. Let player i use resource
r1 in strategy s
1
i and resource r2 in s
2
i . We write d
1
i (r1) → d2i (r2) to describe the
type of the strategy change from s1i to s
2
i . Since there are only two different demands
to begin with, there are just four different types of strategy changes.
• d+ → d+
• d+ → d−
• d− → d+
• d− → d−
In this section, we analyze how a strategy change by one player affects the others,
especially how it can change the best-response of another player who formally was
in an equilibrium. We introduce two new notions which distinguish how exactly a
new best-response is created.
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si
1
s j
3
r1 r2
s j
2
r3
si
2
(1 ) (2)
Figure 7.2: Example for a pushing strategy change. Assuming that player j initially
is in an equilibrium, the improving move of player i from r1 to r2 yields
r3 as the new best-response of j. j is being pushed by i from r2 to r3.
Definition 7.19 (Pushing Strategy Change). Let B be a singleton budget game
with players i, j ∈ N , resources r1, r2, r3 ∈ R and strategy profile s ∈ S. In s, let
si = {r1} and sj = {r2} with ui(s) < ui(s−i, r2) and uj(s) ≥ uj(s−j , r) for all r ∈ R.
Denote s′ = (s−i, r2).
If uj(s
′) < uj(s′−j , r3), then the strategy change by i from r1 to r2 is called a pushing
strategy change.
The idea behind a pushing strategy change is that i relocates to the same resource
as j, increasing the total demand on it. As a result, that resource is then no longer
the best-response of j.
Definition 7.20 (Pulling Strategy Change). Let B be a singleton budget game
with players i, j ∈ N , resources r1, r2, r3 ∈ R and strategy profile s ∈ S. In s, let
si = {r2} and sj = {r1} with uj(s) ≥ uj(s−j , r) for all r ∈ R and ui(s) < ui(s−i, r3).
Denote s′ = (s−i, r3).
If uj(s
′) < ui(s′−j , r2), then the strategy change by i from r2 to r3 is called a pulling
strategy change.
A pulling strategy change decreases the total demand on a resource by a large
enough margin such that another player becomes interested in it. Both pushing
and pulling strategy changes create a new best-response improving move for some
player. If a strategy change by i is both pushing and pulling for one and the same
player j, we always regard it as the former. In such a case, both players switch
their resources.
By combining the concepts of pushing and pulling strategy changes with the
four types of strategy changes available, we are able to give a detailed analysis of
the best-response dynamic. This gives us enough information to determine a Nash
equilibrium only by controlling the order in which the players are allowed to choose
their best-response. We introduce Algorithm 2, which computes a Nash equilibrium
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Algorithm 2 ComputeNE
s0 ← arbitrary strategy profile
Phase 1:
while there is a player with best-response improving move of type d+ → d− do
perform best-response improving move of type d+ → d−
Phase 2:
while current strategy profile s is not a Nash equilibrium do
if there is a player with best-response improving move of type d+ → d− then
perform best-response improving move of type d+ → d−
else if there is a player i with b.r. improving move of type d+ → d+ then
N ′ ← {j ∈ N | j has best-response improving move of type d+ → d+}
choose i ∈ N ′ such that Tsi(s) ≥ Tsj (s) for all j ∈ N ′
perform best-response improving move of i
else
perform best-response improving move . d− → d− or d− → d+
return current strategy profile sNE
s j
1
si
3
r1 r2
si
2
r3
s j
2
(2) (1 )
Figure 7.3: Example for a pulling strategy change. Assuming that player j initially
is in an equilibrium, the improving move of player i from r2 to r3 yields
r2 as the new best-response of j. j is being pulled by i from r1 to r2.
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of any singleton budget game with two demands and unified budgets. Phase 1 of
the algorithm is used to create an intermediate strategy profile without any best-
response improving move of type d+ → d−. With the following three lemmata, we
analyze under which circumstances a new best-response move of this type occurs.
Lemma 7.21. Let s be a strategy profile in phase 2 of Algorithm 2. In s, no
best-response improving move of type d+ → d− is created by a pushing strategy
change.
Proof. Let s be a strategy profile with si = {r1} and sj = {r2} and in which player
i can increase his utility by moving to resource r2.
ui(s) = di(r1) ·min
(
1,
b1
Tr1(s)
)
< di(r2) ·min
(
1,
b2
Tr2(s) + di(r2)
)
= ui(s−i, r2)
Set s′ = (s−i, r2). Now assume that this pushes player j by creating an improving
move of type d+ → d−.
uj(s
′) = d+ ·min
(
1,
b2
Tr2(s) + di(r2)
)
< d− ·min
(
1,
b3
Tr3(s) + d
−
)
= uj(s
′
−j , r3)
This implies
di(r1) ·min
(
1,
b1
Tr1(s)
)
< di(r2) ·min
(
1,
b2
Tr1(s) + di(r2)
)
≤ d+ ·min
(
1,
b2
Tr1(s) + di(r2)
)
< d− ·min
(
1,
b3
Tr3(s) + d
−
)
≤ di(r3) ·min
(
1,
b3
Tr3(s) + di(r3)
)
.
or simply
ui(s−i, r2) < di(r3) ·min
(
1,
b3
Tr3(s) + di(r3)
)
= ui(s−i, r3).
Therefore, player i would have chosen resource r3 instead of r2. If di(r3) = d
−,
then a strategy change of type d+ → d− would have already existed in s. Note that
di(r3) ·min
(
1,
b3
Tr3(s) + di(r3)
)
< di(r3) ·min
(
1,
b3
Tr3(s)
)
,
which covers the case r1 = r3.
Lemma 7.22. Let s be a strategy profile in phase 2 of Algorithm 2. In s, no best-
response improving move of type d+ → d− is created by a pulling strategy change
of type d− → d−.
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Proof. Proof by contradiction. Let s be a strategy profile with si = {r2} and sj =
{r1}, di(r2) = di(r3) = d−, dj(r1) = d+, dj(r2) = d− and both ui(s) < ui(s−i, r3)
and uj(s
′) < uj(s′−j , r2) for s
′ = (s−i, r3). According to our pivot rules, s is an
equilibrium for j. From
ui(s) = d
− ·min
(
1,
b2
Tr2(s)
)
< d− ·min
(
1,
b3
Tr3(s) + d
−
)
= ui(s−i, r3)
and
uj(s) = d
+ ·min
(
1,
b1
Tr1(s)
)
< d− ·min
(
1,
b2
Tr2(s)− d− + d−
)
= d− ·min
(
1,
b2
Tr2(s)
)
= uj(s
′
−j , r2)
we can conclude that
uj(s) = min
(
1, d+ · b1
Tr1(s)
)
< d− ·min
(
1,
b3
Tr3(s) + d
−
)
≤ uj(s−j , r3).
If r2 is the best-response of j after the strategy change of i, then r3 has to be his
best-response before, which contradicts our assumption. For both possible values
of dj(r3), j would have performed this strategy change before i.
Lemma 7.23. Let s be a strategy profile in phase 2 of Algorithm 2. In s, no best-
response improving move of type d+ → d− is created by a pulling strategy change
of type d− → d− if the budgets are unified.
Proof. Proof by contradiction. Let s be a strategy profile with si = {r2} and sj =
{r1}, di(r2) = di(r3) = d+, dj(r1) = d+, dj(r2) = d− and both ui(s) < ui(s−i, r3)
and uj(s
′) < uj(s′−j , r2) for s
′ = (s−i, r3). Since all budgets are equal, we simply
write b instead of br. According to our pivot rules, the best-response of j, there is
no improving move of type d+ → d−. We get
ui(s) = d
+ ·min
(
1,
b
Tr2(s)
)
< d+ ·min
(
1,
b
Tr3(s) + d
+
)
= ui(s−i, r3)
⇒ Tr3(s) < Tr2(s)− d+
and
uj(s) = uj(s
′) = d+·min
(
1,
b
Tr1(s)
)
< d−·min
(
1,
b
Tr2(s)− d+ + d−
)
= uj(s
′
−j , r2).
The rest of the proof is done by case distinction.
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• dj(r3) = d−
First we show that
uj(s) = d
+ ·min
(
1,
b
Tr1(s)
)
≥ d− ·min
(
1,
b
Tr3(s) + d
−
)
= uj(s−j , r3).
Otherwise, there has to be a resource r4 with dj(r4) = d
+ and
uj(s−j , r3) < uj(s−j , r4) = d+ ·min
(
1,
b
Tr4(s) + d
+
)
or the algorithm would allow j to change his strategy instead of i. For the
same reasons, we also get Tr1(s) ≤ Tr2(s), but this contradicts
d+ ·min
(
1,
b
Tr1(s)
)
< d− ·min
(
1,
b
Tr2(s) + d
− − d+
)
≤ d+ ·min
(
1,
b
Tr2(s)
)
.
So we get
uj(s
′
−j , r2) > uj(s) = d
+ ·min
(
1,
b
Tr1(s)
)
≥ d− ·min
(
1,
b
Tr3(s) + d
−
)
= uj(s−j , r3)
or simply
d− ·min
(
1,
b
Tr2(s)− d+ + d−
)
> d− ·min
(
1,
b
Tr3(s) + d
−
)
≥ d− ·min
(
1,
b
Tr2(s)− d+ + d−
)
,
which is also a contradiction.
• dj(r3) = d+
d+ ·min
(
1,
b
Tr1(s)
)
< d− ·min
(
1,
b
Tr2(s)− d+ + d−
)
< d+ ·min
(
1,
b
Tr2(s)− d+ + d+
)
= d+ ·min
(
1,
b
Tr2(s)
)
implies both
min
(
1,
b
Tr1(s)
)
< min
(
1,
b
Tr2(s)
)
⇒ Tr1(s) > Tr2(s)
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and
uj(s) = d
+ ·min
(
1,
b
Tr1(s)
)
< d+ ·min
(
1,
b
Tr2(s)
)
< d+ ·min
(
1,
b
Tr3(s) + d
+
)
= uj(s−j , r3).
If r2 is a best-response of j after the strategy change of i, then r3 would
have been a best-response of j before. Both players have the same priority
according to the pivot rules, but since Tr1(s) > Tr2(s) j would have changed
his strategy first.
This concludes our proof.
If the budgets of the resources can be different, then there are examples where
this last lemma no longer holds and a strategy change of type d+ → d+ pulls a
best-response improving move of type d+ → d−. By now, we know that as long
as there are no improving moves of type d+ → d− to begin with, they will not be
created by those of type d− → d− and d+ → d+. While it is still possible that an
improving move of type d− → d+ results in a new improving move of type d+ → d−,
we circumvent this by introducing macro strategy changes.
Definition 7.24 (Macro Strategy Change). For a singleton budget game B with
players i, j ∈ N and strategy profile s, let si = {r2}, sj = {r1}, di(r2) = dj(r2) and
both ui(s) < ui(s−i, r3) and uj(s′) < uj(s′−j , r2) for s
′ = (s−i, r3). Relocating i from
r2 to r3 and j from r1 to r2 right after another is called a macro strategy change.
A macro strategy change is the combination of two regular strategy changes.
Although not associated with an actual player in the game, we say that such a
strategy change is performed by a virtual player. Using the identifiers from the
definition, we see that the total demand on r2 does not change during a macro
strategy change while that of r1 is decreased by dj(r1) and that of r3 is increased
by di(r3). The next lemma shows that for dj(r1) = di(r3) = d
+, the virtual player
behind the macro strategy change actually benefits from it.
Lemma 7.25. Let s be a strategy profile with a macro strategy change of type
d+ → d+ from r1 to r3. Then
d+ ·min
(
1,
b1
Tr1(s)
)
< d+ ·min
(
1,
b3
Tr3(s) + d
+
)
.
Proof. Due to the underlying strategy changes, we get
d+ ·min
(
1,
b1
Tr1(s)
)
< d− ·min
(
1,
b2
Tr2(s)− d+ + d−
)
< d+ ·min
(
1,
b2
Tr2(s)− d+ + d+
)
< d− ·min
(
1,
b3
Tr3(s) + d
−
)
< d+ ·min
(
1,
b3
Tr3(s)d
+
)
.
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Figure 7.4: Example for a macro strategy change. The improving move of player
j from r1 to r2 is exectued right after the improving move of player
i from r2 to r3. After both strategy changes, the total demand on r2
has not changed. This sequence of strategy changes is equivalent to the
strategy change of a virtual player k from r1 to r3.
The previous lemmata have shown us that once phase 1 of Algorithm 2 has
terminated, strategy changes of type d+ → d− can only exist due to a pulling
strategy change of type d− → d+. By combining these two strategy changes, we
get a single macro strategy change of type d+ → d+ which is actually an improving
move for its virtual player. It therefore shares the main properties of actual strategy
changes of type d+ → d+, namely the following.
Corollary 7.26. A macro strategy change of type d+ → d+ from resource r1 to r3
in strategy profile s satisfies the property
min
(
min
(
1,
b1
Tr1(s)
)
,min
(
1,
b3
Tr3(s)
))
< min
(
min
(
1,
b1
Tr1(s)− d+
)
,min
(
1,
b3
Tr3(s) + d
+
))
.
Thus, a macro strategy change of type d+ → d+ strictly increases a lexicograph-
ical potential function (cf. Definition 7.3), which is the fundamental property used
in the analysis of our algorithm. Since this is generally not the case for strategy
changes of type d− → d+, we augment the concept of such a potential function.
Definition 7.27 (Augmented Lexicographical Potential Function). For a budget
game B with resource r and strategy profile s, let
cr(s) := min
(
1,
br
Tr(s)
)
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and T (s) =
∑
i∈N di(si).
The function φ : S → Rm≥0 with φ(s) = (T (s), cr1(s), . . . , crm(s)) such that the
entries cr(s) are sorted in ascending order is an augmented lexicographical potential
function of B.
This new potential function is similar to the lexicographical potential function,
but it features the additional value T (s), which stands for the total demand on all
resources in the current strategy profile. Note that T (s) is always the first entry
in the tuple φ(s) and only the subsequent one are sorted in ascending order. Just
like with some of the previous potential functions, we use the lexicographical order
<lex as a relation between two values φ(s) and φ(s
′), if applicable. We now have all
the tools needed to prove the following result.
Theorem 7.28. For a singleton budget game B with two demands and unified
budgets and a strategy profile s0 of B, Algorithm 2 returns a Nash equilibrium sNE
of B after a finite number of computational steps.
Proof. By construction, the output of the algorithm is a Nash equilibrium. It
remains to show that the algorithm actually terminates at some point. The number
of improving moves in the first phase is at most n, as every player can act at most
once.
For the second phase, we use the augmented lexicographical potential function
φ. This function is strictly increasing regarding <lex for all strategy changes of
type d− → d− and d+ → d+. In Section 7.1, we have already seen that strategy
changes which leave the current demand of the player unchanged strictly increase
the lexicographical potential function. Since such changes do not influence T (s),
this holds here as well. For strategy changes of type d− → d+, φ is also strictly
increasing because T (s) grows. φ can only decrease for improving moves of type
d+ → d−.
Let s1 be the strategy profile right after phase 1 has terminated. Then s1 con-
tains no best-response improving move of type d+ → d−. According to Lem-
mata 7.21, 7.22 and 7.23, such moves can only appear as the result of a pulling
strategy change of type d− → d+. In this case, both together can be regarded as a
single macro strategy change of type d+ → d+. Because of Corollary 7.26 and the
fact that it does not change the value of T (s), φ grows for such a macro strategy
change, too.
The value of φ grows with at least every second strategy change, so the algorithm
has to terminate at some point. If a pulling strategy change creates multiple best-
response improving moves of type d+ → d− to a resource r, then the algorithm
executes one of them, chosen by some arbitrary rule. Afterwards, the total demand
on r is the same as before the pulling strategy change and the other best-response
moves of type d+ → d− cease to exist.
Although the algorithm decides which strategy changes to prefer over others,
it only performs best-response improving moves. We can therefore conclude this
section with the following insight.
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Corollary 7.29. Every singleton budget game with two demands and unified bud-
gets is weakly acyclic.
We do not know if this result carries over to matroid budget games with the same
restrictions. Regarding budget games with two demands and unified budgets but
arbitrary strategy space structures, we refer to the game B0 from Definition 4.1 and
the introduction of Chapter 6. We see that there are games of this type without a
Nash equilibrium.
Corollary 7.30. There are budget games with two demands and unified budgets
without a Nash equilibrium.
7.5 Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Matroid Budget
Games
To conclude this chapter, we take a last look at approximate Nash equilibria and
focus on matroid budget games (all results from Chapter 6 are independent of
how the strategy spaces are structured). However, we no longer have to bound
the demands with respect to the budgets, i.e. the value of δ from the definition of
δ-share budget games does not influence our result. This time, the crucial factor
(besides the matroid property) is the largest ratio between any two demands of the
same player. The closer this ratio is to 1, the better our result. Depending on the
instances, this can lead to better upper bounds for the existence of approximate
Nash equilibria than the one from Chapter 6.
Once more, the main tool in this section is the lexicographical potential function
φ introduced in Definition 7.3. We use φ to give a new bound on the existence of
approximate Nash equilibria, specifically for matroid budget games.
Theorem 7.31. Let α ∈ R≥1 and B be a matroid budget game such that for
every player i and all resources r1, r2 it holds that
di(r2)
di(r1)
≤ α. Then B has an
α-approximate Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let dmaxi := max{di(r) | r ∈ R} and dmini := min{di(r) | r ∈ R}. We use
the lexicographical potential function φ from Definition 7.3 and let the players only
perform improving moves which also increase φ. While this may not lead to a Nash
equilibrium, it always yields an α-approximate Nash equilibrium for
α = max
{
dmaxi
dmini
| i ∈ N
}
.
Since B is a matroid budget game, every strategy change can be modeled as a
sequence of lazy moves and every lazy move increases the utility of the corresponding
player. Otherwise, a lazy move can simply be omitted and the resulting strategy
is still valid. Let s be a strategy profile of B in which player i can switch resource
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r1 for r2 to increase his utility, resulting in strategy profile s
′. We restrict the
best-response dynamic such that we only allow this lazy move if it also satisfies
di(r1) ·min
(
1,
br1
Tr1(s)
)
< di(r1) ·min
(
1,
br2
Tr2(s) + di(r1)
)
.
Note that under this restriction, player i would still profit from the strategy change
if his demand on both r1 and r2 is the same. As shown in the proof of Theorem 7.31,
such a lazy move increases φ. In addition to the strategy changes where the de-
mand actually does not change, this also includes lazy moves in which the demand
decreases (cf. Lemma 7.1) and some of those in which the demand increases.
By following this restricted best-response dynamic, we obtain a strategy profile
sα. Let s′ be a strategy profile with ui(sα) < ui(s′) and which originates from sα by
a unilateral strategy change of i. The strategy change of i from sαi to s
′
i consists
only of lazy moves of the form
ui,r1(s
α) = di(r1) ·min
(
1,
br1
Tr1(s
α)
)
< di(r2) ·min
(
1,
br2
Tr2(s
α) + di(r2)
)
= ui,r2(s
′)
with di(r1) < di(r2) and cr1(s
α) ≥ cr2(s′). We get
ui(s
′)
ui(sα)
=
∑
r′∈s′i ui,r′(s
′)∑
r∈sαi ui,r(s
α)
=
∑
r′∈s′i di(r
′) · cr′(s′)∑
r∈sαi di(r) · cr(sα)
≤
∑
r′∈s′i d
max
i · cr′(s′)∑
r∈sαi d
min
i · cr(sα)
=
dmaxi ·
∑
r′∈s′i cr′(s
′)
dmini ·
∑
r∈sαi cr(s
α)
≤
dmaxi ·
∑
r∈sαi cr(s
α)
dmini ·
∑
r∈sαi cr(s
α)
=
dmaxi
dmini
.
If the demands of each individual player do not differ too much from each other
(similar to Section 6.4), then a matroid budget game already has an α-approximate
Nash equilibria for small α, even for large values of δ (e.g. δ = 1). If the ratios
between the demands of a player are large but δ is small, we can use the upper
bound from Section 6.1 and still obtain good results. For matroid budget games,
we now have two different upper bounds which depend on different aspects of budget
games and are therefore not really compared easily. Based on the actual structure
of a budget game, however, we can always use the better of the two bounds.
This concludes the current chapter. We considered a number of different classes
of singleton and matroid budget games and proved that they all possess pure Nash
equilibria. However, we do not know if this also holds for all matroid budget games.
92
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
8
Conclusion
To conclude this thesis, we summarize our results and discuss a number of open
problems.
8.1 Synopsis
We introduced a new game theoretical model called budget games, in which the
players compete over resources with a finite budget. As a strategy, a player chooses
a vector of different demands. In the resulting strategy profile, each player has a
non-negative demand on every resource. If the total demand by all players does not
exceed the budget of a resource, then the demand of each player on that resource
is fully satisfied. Otherwise, the budget is split between the players proportionally,
with each player receiving less than what he demands (or receiving nothing). We
denote the share of a resources’ budget received by a player as the utility he obtains
from that resource. The total utility of a player is then the sum of the individual
utilities obtained from the resources. We showed that pure Nash equilibria generally
do not exist in budget games and therefore turned our attention to a number of
alternative concepts.
As a first approach, we changed the way the budgets are distributed among
the players. While budget games are strategic games and the utility of each player
depends only on the current strategies of all players, the alternative model of ordered
budget games emphasizes the order of the player decisions. A strategy change by
a player does not decrease the utility of any other player. Instead, if the remaining
budget of a resource is not enough to satisfy his demand, then he only receives the
part of the budget not yet allocated to another player. Ordered budget games are
exact potential games, which in their case even guarantees the existence of super-
strong pure Nash equilibria. Although computing a strong pure Nash equilibrium
is possible in only linear time, the best-response dynamic may need an exponential
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number of steps before reaching any equilibrium. Also, the problem of finding a
super-strong pure Nash equilibrium is NP-hard. While the price of stability of
ordered budget games is 1, their price of anarchy is 2.
We also considered α-approximate pure Nash equilibria in budget games and
introduced an approximate potential function, which yielded an upper bound αuδ
on α such that every budget game has the finite improvement property regarding
α-moves for α > αuδ . This upper bound depends on the share δ of a resources’
budget which a player is at most allowed to demand. A lower bound αlδ, also
depending on δ, was given as well. Although not tight, the gap between the two
bounds decreases with δ. A different approach for matroid budget games yields
upper bounds on α which do not rely on δ, but depend on the ratios between
each players largest and smallest single demand. There are still instances with
α-approximate pure Nash equilibria for α < αlδ (e.g. α = 1). However, finding
such an equilibrium is NP-hard. If we choose α = αuδ + ε for ε > 0 and the ratio
between the highest-demand strategies of the different players is at most λ, then the
best-response dynamic consisting only of α-moves reaches an α-approximate pure
Nash equilibrium in time polynomial in λ, ε−1 and n. Finally, the optimal solution,
i.e. the strategy profile which maximizes social welfare, can be approximated up
to a polylogarithmic factor in linear time using α-moves. For matroid budget
games, we give an approximation algorithm with an approximation factor of 1− 1e .
Since finding the optimal solution for budget games and ordered budget games is
equivalent, these algorithms also hold for the latter. The problem of computing an
exact optimal solution is NP-hard.
Our last approach was to restrict the structure of the strategy spaces and only
consider different classes of singleton and matroid budget games. For reasons of
clarity, we list the major results in Table 8.1. In singleton budget games with fixed
demands, pure Nash equilibria can be computed in linear time.
8.2 Outlook
The central point of this thesis are the properties needed to guarantee the exis-
tence of (approximate) pure Nash equilibria in budget games. For general δ-share
budget games, we gave both upper and lower bounds regarding the existence of
approximate equilibria. While our results improve with decreasing δ, these bounds
are never really tight. Considering that the upper bound was derived from an ap-
proximated potential function, it seems likely that it can still be improved by using
some different approach. The approximated potential function dismisses the fact
that the potential of a player at a resource can be larger than the utility which
he obtains from it. Instead, when a player performs a strategy change, we assume
that these two values are the same for all resources used by the new strategy and
we require that the increase in utility alone ensures that the potential of the game
grows as well. For further details, we refer to the proof of Theorem 6.4. Since
utility and potential of a player for some resource are only the same if his demand
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Strategy Space Structure
Restriction Singleton Matroid General
fixed demands FIP FIP no NE
2 resources WA WA ?
ordered players &
NE ? no NE
increasing demand ratios
2 demands, 1 budget WA ? no NE
Table 8.1: Overview of our results regarding pure Nash equilibria in strategic bud-
get games. FIP stands for finite improvement property, WA for weakly
acyclic and NE for pure Nash equilibria. We believe that while not ev-
ery game with two resources has a pure Nash equilibrium, the results
regarding the last two restrictions can be extended to matroid budget
games.
is fully satisfied, this can be considered an exception. Usually, the increase in the
game’s potential exceeds the increase in the player’s utility and in many situations,
a lesser increase in utility is needed to raise the potential of the game. The fact
that better upper bounds exist for approximate equilibria in matroid budget games
only reinforces our belief that there is still room for improvement.
In Chapter 7, we analyzed different classes of singleton and matroid budget
games, which all possess pure Nash equilibria. This research was motivated by
the fact that matroid congestion games always have pure Nash equilibria and that
this property is also maximal in the sense that for every non-matroid set system,
there is a corresponding congestion game without a pure Nash equilibrium. Backed
by our observations from simulations of the dynamics of budget games, we strongly
believe this also holds for matroid budget game, i.e. every matroid budget game
possesses a pure Nash equilibrium. Sadly, we did find neither a proof nor a counter
example for this statement, so the question regarding its correctness remains open.
In the introduction, we motivated the model of budget games via the example
of clients choosing servers with limited computational capacity to handle their re-
quests. Every request consists of a number of services, each with his own size. As
a strategy, a player allocates the services to the servers. In this context, we expect
the total demands of all strategies of a given player to be the same, i.e.∑
r∈R
s(r) =
∑
r∈R
s′(r) (8.1)
for all strategies s, s′ of the same player. This reflects the natural assumption
that the size of each request is unaffected by its actual allocation to the servers.
However, our model is actually more powerful in the sense that Equation 8.1 is
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not obligatory. Even if we restrict our model by the limitation imposed by Equa-
tion 8.1, pure Nash equilibria still do not exist in general. The δ-share budget game
B0 introduced in Definition 4.1 and used to show the nonexistence of pure Nash
equilibria already satisfies this condition. As far as we are aware, we also do not
gain any other advantages by restricting the model in this way. When the total
demands differ between the strategies of a player, a single player always prefers the
strategy with the highest total demand on all resources combined, provided their
budget is sufficient to satisfy these demands and assuming that δ ≤ 1. Depending
on other player’s demands on the resources, this preference is subject to change.
We come back to this concept of flexible demands in a moment. First, we consider
a natural and interesting extension of our model, the addition of prices to the
strategies. Thinking back to the two examples from the introduction, neither the
allocation of requests to external servers nor the competition in a market are free.
Instead, both induce some costs for the players, which they are going to compare
with the resulting utility, the resulting payoff being the difference between utility
and costs. In the past, we already considered a basic version of this extension in
the form of a bachelor thesis. Simulations suggested that every singleton budget
games with fixed prices for the strategies has the finite improvement property.
Other possibilities would include prices which depend on the total demands on the
resources or which are set functions over the players. It would be interesting to see
how our results are affected by the existence of prices alone.
In addition, we can combine prices with flexible demands to model strategies of
different quality. We already explained that the higher the demand of a player on
a group of resources, the more attractive they are to him. This is independent of
the resources’ budgets. On the other hand, a lower demand on the same resources
can only yield a smaller utility, even if their budgets are sufficient. We can regard
this as different options of using the same resources but with varying quality. As an
example, consider video streaming, where a higher quality is preferred, but also puts
a higher workload on the data connections. By adding different prices to different
levels of quality, the players are able to decide for themselves which option is best
suited for them. This reflects the basic assumption that quality is expensive and
the players balance the option of using cheap strategies against more expensive,
but better ones instead of simply choosing the best one available.
Finally, ordered budget games have the ability to model scenarios with old and
new players. Providers already established in a market usually have an advantage
against new competitors, since their product or service is already well-known. In an
ordered budget games, this property is available to some degree, as a new provider
cannot obtain any utility currently held by someone else. As a next step, it would
be interesting to combine the premises of both strategic and ordered budget games.
For example, a new parameter β ∈ [0, 1] could be introduced to determine how
much of the other players current utilities could possible be obtained through a
strategy change. Here, β = 0 describes ordered budget games while β = 1 is
akin to strategic budget games. For small β, the new provider would still have
a disadvantage against the others, but to a lesser degree. Keeping the concept
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of strategy-dependent demands in mind, such parameters could also be directly
associated with a strategy. Instead of one global value for β, every strategy s would
have its own βs. This leads to different strategies having different levels of (dis)-
advantages. Combining this with prices for the strategies as discussed above would
enable us to model scenarios in which the new player has the option to choose more
expensive investments (e.g. more advertisements) to strengthen his own position
among the established players or pay less and only fill out the niches currently left
empty. Such a model would be quite robust and could be used to model a multitude
of non-strategic scenarios.
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